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THE HIGH COST OF LOW SANCTIONS 
Irina D. Manta* 
Abstract 
Low sanctions can initially appear to be a mitigating factor for unjust 
or inefficient laws, but this perception is likely wrong. This Article 
argues that low sanctions may have a pernicious effect on the 
democratic process and on legislative rule making because, as both 
public choice theory and historical precedent suggest, the laws 
accompanying these sanctions are more likely to perpetuate themselves 
and become part of the unquestioned background fabric of society. This 
Article focuses on intellectual property law (in particular, copyright) 
and examines the progression of suboptimal laws through widespread 
low sanctions that may mostly escape the public eye until sanctions then 
grow to more significant size. In intellectual property, as elsewhere, 
low-level sanctions coupled with problematic laws are less likely than 
their high-sanction counterparts to attract the attention of the media and 
lead to political action. This Article makes several claims about low 
sanctions. The first is that low sanctions increase the likelihood that a 
problematic law will be passed. Second, low sanctions decrease the 
odds that such a law will be repealed. Third, unjust laws with low 
sanctions bear the risk that the sanctions will (sometimes gradually) 
rise, and thus reduce any upsides that accompany the initial low level of 
the sanctions. By the time this occurs, it may prove an irreversible 
change because it is more difficult to abolish a law than to prevent its 
initial passage. The media plays a key role in these processes when it 
focuses on the identifiable victims of high sanctions and fails to pay 
attention to the statistical victims of low sanctions. Last, whether 
sanctions for single offenses are high or low, prosecutors can 
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accumulate counts in a way that significantly intimidates alleged 
offenders with sometimes dramatic consequences. This practice was 
visible in the recent stories about computer coder and Internet activist 
Aaron Swartz’s prosecution and suicide. Examples from intellectual 
property and other legal areas should encourage us to take a closer look 
at existing or proposed legislation that appears harmless enough at first 
glance due to its low sanctions or lack of enforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At first blush, low sanctions can appear to be a mitigating factor for 
unjust or inefficient laws, but this perception is likely wrong. This 
Article argues that low sanctions have a pernicious effect on the 
democratic process and on legislative rule making. Both public choice 
theory and historical precedent demonstrate that, even when they 
accompany unjust laws, such sanctions are likely to perpetuate 
themselves and become part of the unquestioned background fabric of 
society. In short, there are few popular uprisings and little lobbying 
activity for change because of inappropriate $100 fines. While the 
injustice or disutility that any individual suffers from a low unwarranted 
sanction is relatively small, the aggregate effect could prove 
dangerously problematic, to the point of adding up to a greater overall 
injustice or reduction in utility than a high sanction would induce. 
Indeed, in some instances we may find ourselves more disturbed by the 
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knowledge that 1,000 individuals paid an unfair $200 fine (collectively 
paying $200,000) than that one individual paid an undue $10,000 fine.1 
The $200 fines, however, make for boring press. Therefore, the media 
leaves the public unaware of the problem, whereas the larger the unjust 
sanction is, the likelier the media is to publicize the story and the 
likelier it is that the public and, as a result, lawmakers will pay attention 
to it, which is usually the first step toward changing a law.  
What compounds the problem of selective popularization of stories 
in the media is many people’s bias toward caring about the fate of 
specific, concrete human lives (also known as identifiable lives) much 
more than about the fate of statistical lives.2 Hence, even in a world in 
which everyone accepts a utilitarian framework to view the law, people 
will show excessive concern for named individual victims of unjust 
laws over statistical victims. Because of this phenomenon, even if 
society is theoretically aware that large numbers of people suffer from 
low sanctions, it is unlikely to develop a strong sense of indignation. 
Were the media to cover a few of these people’s stories, this would only 
begin to scratch the surface, and most individuals whom the sanctions 
affect would remain statistical regardless, which would trigger a much 
reduced level of outrage. Viewed mathematically, a newspaper story 
that discusses the $200 fines levied against five individuals will still add 
up to a total of only $1,000 brought to the public’s attention—a mere 
pittance in comparison to the single $10,000 fine. And this calculation 
makes the presumption that individuals are necessarily able to recognize 
and understand collective disutility in such a way that it affects their 
decision-making.  
Public choice theory teaches us that political action is unlikely when 
the costs of the status quo are widely distributed, so the individuals who 
pay the $200 fines are unlikely to organize collectively because each 
has only a small stake in the matter and the transaction costs of 
organization are high.3 The public at large may not take action because 
each individual is relatively unafraid to face the risk of paying a $200 
fine at some point in her life even if the probability of doing so is high, 
and she therefore views the certain cost of political involvement as 
excessive in comparison with the chance of facing a small unjust fine.4 
                                                                                                                     
 1. This is reminiscent of scammers that are difficult to uncover because they only take a 
few cents each from large numbers of individuals. I would like to thank Professor Rebecca 
Tushnet for her comments on this point. 
 2. See discussion of statistical versus identifiable lives infra Section I.C. 
 3. For a discussion of this type of collective action problem in the political context, see 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 58 (1965). 
 4. In this example, one could argue that for some individuals of very low socioeconomic 
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If neither the individuals who may or do face low sanctions nor those 
who watch others receive unjust low sanctions will take action (or if 
that latter group of watchers never exists given the absence of media 
coverage), then the legislative status quo is likely to persist. 
This Article makes several claims about low sanctions. The first is 
that low sanctions increase the likelihood that an unjust law will be 
passed. Second, low sanctions decrease the odds that such a law will be 
repealed. Third, an additional risk of unjust laws with low sanctions is 
that the sanctions will (sometimes progressively) rise and thus reduce 
any upsides that accompany the initial low level of the sanctions. By the 
time this occurs, it may prove an irreversible change because it is more 
difficult to abolish a law than to prevent its initial passage. Fourth, 
whether sanctions are high or low, prosecutors can often bring multiple 
counts against individuals for a single offense, and thus create large 
threats to those individuals’ futures in a manner the statutes’ drafters 
probably failed to consider. This practice was apparent in the 
prosecution and suicide at age twenty-six of computer coder and 
Internet activist Aaron Swartz, who was charged with thirteen criminal 
counts that added up to a theoretical total of thirty-five years in prison 
for hacking into MIT’s network to download and release a large amount 
of articles from an academic database.5 His story also provides an 
example for my claim that a known individual victim, especially a high-
profile one, can prove key to encouraging discourse about legal changes 
and increase the likelihood of implementing them. 
After presenting the general case for the dangers that lie in low 
sanctions for unjust laws, this Article turns its attention to several 
diverse areas that exemplify the previously described trends. These 
areas include criminal laws prohibiting marijuana and sodomy and, 
most relevantly, intellectual property infringement such as some forms 
of copyright infringement. The argument focuses especially on the 
evolution toward higher sanctions that encountered successful resistance 
only after (1) the courts asked infringers to pay hundreds of thousands 
of dollars or the government threatened them with extradition, and 
(2) the threat of prison and other repercussions for actions such as the 
unauthorized streaming of illegal content led to significant media and 
individual responses. The examples from copyright law illustrate the 
cautionary tale that laws with low sanctions provide. They should also 
encourage individuals to take a closer look at existing and proposed 
legislation that appears harmless enough at first glance, be it in 
intellectual property or other areas of law. 
                                                                                                                     
status, a $200 fine is not insignificant. These same individuals, however, are unlikely to wield 
political power in most instances. 
 5. See infra Section II.C. 
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This Article begins in Part I with an examination of how the side 
effects of low sanctions in legislation differ from those of high 
sanctions, what the consequences of unenforced laws can be, and how 
the media contributes to individuals’ bias toward causes that involve 
high sanctions. Part II shows how the principles that Part I demonstrates 
have played out in the area of offenses against intangible property, and 
particularly in the contexts of copyright statutory sanctions, the 
downfall of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act 
(PIPA), and the prosecution of Aaron Swartz. Part III is the conclusion.  
I.  THE EFFECT OF LOW SANCTIONS 
This Part illustrates several points about low sanctions through 
examples from a variety of legal contexts. First, it shows how low 
sanctions promote the enactment of unjust laws and make it more 
difficult to repeal them. Second, it demonstrates the dangers of low 
sanctions observable through the resistance to change of unenforced or 
other unpopular laws. Third, this Part elucidates how the media’s focus 
on identifiable victims at the expense of statistical ones exacerbates the 
fact that, to society’s detriment, people generally pay insufficient 
attention to laws that impose low sanctions. 
A.  Enacting and Repealing Legislation 
After legislators propose a bill at the federal or state level, passage 
most basically requires that a majority of the people’s representatives 
vote in favor of it. But what motivates a representative to vote in a 
particular way? The numerous factors affecting such decisions include 
the sentiments of the representative’s constituents, the level of financial 
contributions tied to a piece of legislation, the prominence of the 
representative(s) who propose the legislation, and the media’s attitude 
toward the legislation as well as the level of coverage that it gives to a 
specific bill. This Article argues that if the goal is to pass a law that a 
significant portion of the population will view as unjust or inefficient, 
then lower sanctions will prove strategically useful in many situations. 
As a corollary, the existence of low sanctions will make it more difficult 
for opponents to effectuate the repeal of existing laws. This is true both 
of laws that are considered unjust regardless of the level of sanctions 
and of those that will only be viewed as unjust if their sanctions rise to a 
particular level over time.  
This Article’s use of the terms “high” versus “low” with regard to 
sanctions is fairly loose, in part because sanctions lie on a spectrum that 
has neither clear cut-off points nor entirely neat categories. Hence, this 
Article does not draw an artificial bright line between the two. 
Generally speaking, civil fines that represent a small percentage of most 
people’s income usually qualify as “low.” Large civil fines and many 
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criminal sanctions fall into the “high” designation. It is also important to 
recognize the distinction between possible sanctions on the books and 
sanctions as enforced. The level of either can affect public attitudes 
about pending or enacted legislation depending on the circumstances.6 
A number of this Article’s claims should thus be viewed as comparing 
relatively higher to relatively lower sanctions in their respective effects. 
The distinctions between the levels include elements such as the type of 
sanctions (e.g., civil versus criminal), the height of the sanctions in the 
law as written, the likely height of the sanctions in the law as applied, as 
well as individuals’ likely subjective experiences of different types and 
heights of sanctions, among other factors. 
This Article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive definition 
of what makes a law unjust or inefficient. Indeed, for purposes of this 
Article, it is presumed that such laws are simply those which large 
numbers of the voting public perceive to be more disadvantageous than 
advantageous. Or, to put it differently, this involves laws that society 
likely would not have supported at the time of passage if it (1) had been 
aware of them and (2) understood how they would be implemented.7 
Therefore, one could say that this Article examines how to best 
minimize outcomes that are undemocratic over the long run. This 
Article will not reiterate or reanalyze the existing general arguments 
about the ability of the public choice framework to explain individual 
versus collective behavior.8 Rather, this Article specifically analyzes 
how the level of sanctions changes behaviors if the foundations of that 
model are taken as given, and to what extent the media influences the 
degree of political involvement with high versus low sanctions. 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Most of the time, the relevant total punishment (P) consists of the maximum possible 
sanction for an offense (S) times the odds of enforcement (O) and multiplied by the discount 
value of the actual punishment that a court imposes (DV), as follows: P = S x O x DV. It is 
noteworthy that the same value of P will not necessarily have the same effect on all individuals’ 
behavior and that, at some times, people care more about the level of sanctions while at other 
times they care more about the sanctions’ frequency. See, e.g., infra notes 130–34 and 
accompanying text. 
 7. This is not to say that democratic desire always aligns with what one would define as 
“just” based on abstract theories of morality, but this Article often uses democratic notions of 
justice as a proxy to derive general principles. As all proxies, it is imperfect, but it provides a 
number of advantages such as serving the goals of administrability (the extent to which a law 
pleases the public is measurable through polls and other tools) and legitimacy (the consent—and 
assent—of the governed is of recognized importance to the American legal system even among 
individuals who disagree on the relative merits of various abstract moral theories). See generally 
Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 607 (2000) (advocating for the use of norm-shifting “soft nudges” at times precisely to 
pass legislation that would fail if it contained “hard shoves”). 
 8. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 3, at 57–60 (providing some of the foundational work in 
this context). 
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One situation particularly prone to allowing for the passage of 
suboptimal laws may occur when a single crisis, or one of a few, gives 
rise to reactionary legislation. Crises can temporarily crystallize public 
sentiment in such a way that the majority of society is either not willing 
or not able to forestall sweeping legal changes despite the fact that these 
changes, as a whole, go against the overall will of the relevant 
population at either the national or local level. The immediate aftermath 
of crises can bring about a potentially dangerous combination of 
heightened public emotions, the real or perceived need to pass 
legislation quickly, a willingness to exchange substantive liberties and 
procedural rights for perceived safety, and political opportunism.9 One 
example where these factors possibly combined was the passage of the 
USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act) after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Commentators noted a number of years after the 
attacks that many Americans “have accepted possible privacy intrusions 
at times of national crisis—but not on an unlimited or permanent basis. 
As the immediacy of the sense of crisis wanes, interest in privacy rights 
can reassert itself.”10 While the likelihood that many (and perhaps most) 
legislators who voted in favor of the Patriot Act failed to read the text of 
the bill11 does not, in itself, authoritatively put the law into the 
suboptimal category, it does cast a shadow on the Act’s legitimacy.12 
This piece of evidence also shows the strength of the effect of crisis on 
lawmaking, as Congress fears a much greater backlash if it fails to act 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark 4–5 (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper 
No. 442, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974148 (“For 
a legislator, ‘doing something’ in response to a crisis is both easier to explain to anxious 
constituents, and more likely to be positively reported in the media, than inaction, and therefore 
it would appear to be a clear-cut superior route to reelection, which is the posited focus of 
legislators.”). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the 
Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1643 
(2009) (providing a more complex picture of crisis legislation that stems from the idea that 
“[t]he basic dilemma for legislatures is that before a crisis, they lack the motivation and 
information to provide for it in advance, while after the crisis has occurred, they have no 
capacity to manage it themselves” (emphasis omitted)); Adrian Vermeule, Emergency 
Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1155 (2008) (“[T]he circumstances of 
emergency lawmaking do not create a systematic tilt towards increasing executive power 
beyond the point that a rational legislature would specify.”). 
 10. Gary Langer, Poll: Support Seen for Patriot Act, ABC NEWS (June 9, 2005), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/PollVault/story?id=833703#.UNOAom80WSo. For a discussion and 
proposals about how to achieve a sensible trade-off between safety and liberty, see generally 
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 
(2004). 
 11. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 267 (2007). 
 12. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135, 
141, 148 (2011) (arguing that legislators have a duty to read bills before voting to pass them). 
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rapidly than if it fails to act optimally.13 
In the face of the great forces present after crises, only a massive and 
concerted public outcry can stop inefficient laws or even moderately 
reshape them. Some factors that may determine the level of outcry 
include the particular area of legislation that a law involves, a bill’s 
level of perceived injustice, the level of media scrutiny, and the amount 
of resources available to the outraged individuals. For several of these 
factors, the level of sanctions is likely to have a direct or indirect effect 
on the degree of outcry that results. As this Article mentions in the 
Introduction, high sanctions make for better media stories. This is true 
not only for implemented laws, but also for the stimulation of the 
public’s imagination and emotions about a proposed bill. It is helpful to 
envision the following matrix that depicts part of the relationship 
between public sentiment and sanctions. Each row depicts a different 
level of perceived “pure” injustice, which means injustice as defined 
before lawmakers apportion any sanctions for an offense.14 As 
previously mentioned, this Article mainly uses democratic 
understandings of justice, and these could entail public perceptions that 
the crime is unjust in substance or that its enforcement entails 
                                                                                                                     
 13. For one historical account of the passage of the Patriot Act, see generally Beryl A. 
Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145 
(2004). The actual effects of the Patriot Act remain in controversy, as some scholars argue that 
its downsides have been exaggerated. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the 
USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 608 (2003) (arguing that 
the Patriot Act did not dramatically expand law enforcement power and made “mostly minor 
amendments to the electronic surveillance laws”); see also Eric Posner, There’s Still a Need, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/07/do-
we-still-need-the-patriot-act/theres-still-a-need-for-the-patriot-act (“As we lose some of our 
security, it is natural and proper for government to increase surveillance and other security 
measures at the margin, and to some extent the Patriot Act was just making up for lost time.”); 
Nathan A. Sales, A Vital Weapon, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011, 11:54 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/07/do-we-still-need-the-patriot-act/the-patriot-
act-is-a-vital-weapon-in-fighting-terrorism (arguing that the Patriot Act remains a key tool in the 
fight against terrorism). Meanwhile, other scholars state that “[f]rom the beginning, Democratic 
and Republican critics of the Patriot Act warned that its extraordinary surveillance powers 
would be used to investigate political dissent or low-level offenses rather than terrorism. And 
their fears were soon vindicated.” Jeffrey Rosen, Too Much Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011, 
11:54 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/07/do-we-still-need-the-patriot-
act/the-patriot-act-gives-too-much-power-to-law-enforcement. See generally SUSAN N. 
HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
(2011) (compiling civil liberties violations since the events of September 11, 2001). 
 14. It is understood that the level of sanctions then also affects the perceived justice of a 
bill. One of the starkest illustrations of this principle is enshrined in the Eighth Amendment, 
which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” with the understanding that a law that is 
otherwise legitimate can become illegitimate if it crosses a certain threshold of harshness. See 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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unacceptable discriminatory aspects.15 Meanwhile, the columns in the 
following table delineate the level of sanctions: 
 
 High sanctions Low sanctions 
High injustice Likely outrage Possible outrage 
Low injustice Possible outrage Unlikely outrage 
 
While outrage is still possible in the low-sanctions scenario, it is not 
as likely as in the high-sanctions scenario. Indeed, there are cases in 
which the level of sanctions makes the marginal difference as to 
(1) whether there is outrage or (2) what the level of outrage is. This 
determines whether groups mobilize on particular issues, how much 
money individuals and groups spend on issues, and so on.  
In some situations, legislators have clear incentives to set sanctions 
high when they draft and pass bills. For example, they may want to 
show that they are “tough on crime” and that they take an appropriately 
stern stance against terrorists.16 In other cases, however, the sanctions 
that the problematic laws include are low or even nonexistent. An 
example might include a law that seeks to expand a specific national or 
local executive power with murky consequences rather than create a 
new offense type. These cases are more likely to create an impression 
that, while a law may seem dubious in other ways, the harm to any of 
the victims of its inherent injustice is not egregious enough to warrant 
the requisite investment for an effective public outcry. The government 
also has other incentives to exercise some degree of moderation in 
setting punishments, and its rent-seeking nature may lead to the creation 
of “enforcement and punishment with the goal of appropriating the rents 
of the criminal market. Deterrence is still relevant in this context, 
although, paradoxically, it is something that often impedes the 
government’s objective. When high probabilities of detection and high 
fines deter offenses too much, revenue from fines goes down.”17 One 
consideration in the passage of laws is that the government must expend 
resources on enforcement, so fines of various forms can prove more 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See supra note 7. 
 16. Indeed, sometimes legislators or constituents do not perceive a law with low sanctions 
as important, which could present an impediment to its passage. See Rachel E. Barkow, 
Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1277–78 (2005) (arguing 
that the “tough-on-crime” language irrationally tends to lead only to harsher sanctions because 
any alternative would be perceived as “soft on crime”). 
 17. Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking 
Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 117 (2002). 
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lucrative than punishments like incarceration or probation.18 
It bears mention that repealing laws tends to be at least as difficult as 
passing them.19 Indeed, it is most likely quite a bit harder to repeal a law 
than to block its initial passage, in part because the public becomes 
more indifferent to even constitutional violations once these violations 
gain status as “the new normal.” One of the reasons it is so difficult to 
study the number of laws that legislators repeal each year is that a repeal 
often takes the form of the passage of a different bill. Further, many 
legislators modify laws rather than eliminate them altogether, so the 
development of a metric as to what constitutes a genuine repeal is 
extremely difficult. It is clear, however, that more laws are enacted 
yearly than are removed.20 This fact could stem from the positive effects 
that many laws bring—the idea being that there are more laws because 
they benefit society, which would make repeal undesirable—but this is 
far from certain.  
One extreme example of the difficulties that the repeal process 
involves is the prohibition of alcohol in the United States. The 
prohibition wrought disastrous consequences before it could be 
abolished, such as the rise of the Mafia, widespread corruption, and 
extensive inequality of enforcement between socioeconomic classes.21 
Not only that, but the federal government, tasked primarily with the 
protection of citizens, may have purposefully poisoned alcohol during 
that period and killed at least 10,000 individuals who imbibed the 
substance.22 While most examples do not entail such dramatic 
consequences, on balance it seems reasonable to move forward with the 
assumption that repeal is generally at least as difficult as initial passage 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 179–80 (1968). 
 19. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1573, 1606 n.146 (2007) (“[F]ederal lawmaking procedures make it difficult not only to 
adopt, but to repeal federal law. The Founders recognized this danger, but thought that Congress 
could draft around it if necessary.” (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 587 (comments of James Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 1911)). 
 20. State legislatures alone passed 29,000 new laws in 2012, the vast majority of which 
are unlikely to constitute “repeals” of other laws in any meaningful sense. See Yamiche 
Alcindor, More than 400 New Laws Take Effect Tuesday, USA TODAY (Dec. 31, 2012 11:10 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/29/new-laws-in-2013/1797249/. 
 21. See, e.g., THOMAS R. PEGRAM, BATTLING DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY 
AMERICA, 1800–1933, at 174–75 (1998) (describing the resulting corruption and violence during 
the Prohibition era). Meanwhile, the “War on Drugs” of other sorts continues despite what some 
view as its far-reaching negative effects. For a discussion of marijuana laws in the context of the 
difficulty of changing relatively unpopular laws, see Section I.B. 
 22. Deborah Blum, The Chemist’s War, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2010, 10:00 AM), 
http://beta.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2010/02/the_chemists_war.
html. 
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and probably more so.23 
The factors that affect outrage during repeal resemble those during 
initial passage, except that low sanctions may prove even more 
pernicious in that context. The passage of a new bill yields some natural 
media attention and public reaction, while a law that sits on the books 
requires a greater amount of energy for any public reaction to gain 
momentum. One factor that facilitates repeal of a suboptimal law 
compared to passage is that there is time for individual stories to 
develop about the people who experienced negative effects such as 
unjust sanctions. Nevertheless, these stories are more likely to appear 
and to make an impression if they involve high sanctions.  
B.  The Lowest Sanction of Them All: Nonenforcement? 
This section shows how unenforced laws, which imply sanctions of 
zero, can still have uniquely pernicious effects.24 It also discusses how 
both unenforced and generally unpopular laws can persist in the face of 
large-scale criticism.25 Some of the concerns behind unenforced laws 
gave rise to the doctrine of desuetude, which allows for the judicial 
abrogation of laws that have not been enforced for a long time. This 
doctrine, however, is officially recognized only in West Virginia among 
American jurisdictions.26 An interesting example in the context of 
nonenforcement is sodomy laws. While sodomy laws carried high 
sanctions on the books of many states in the past,27 in practice the 
average person “guilty” of acts of sodomy rarely suffered any official 
sanctions even before courts declared the laws unconstitutional.28 This 
                                                                                                                     
 23. The treatment of marijuana legislation is instructive in this respect. See Section I.B. 
 24. This section does not imply that it is necessarily optimal to enforce every law at all 
times. Frequently, there is space for a sensible buffer for minor infractions, and perfect 
enforcement is prohibitively expensive in any case, among other problems. 
 25. Some argue that not all laws need to be popular and that, occasionally, legislatures 
should shape preferences rather than perpetuate them. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An 
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1. 
While this may prove true under some circumstances, American government is generally 
understood as one that seeks to respect and enforce the democratic will. 
 26. Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209 (2006). Whether more jurisdictions 
should recognize desuetude has been a question for lively scholarly debate. See id. at 2209–10 
nn.4 & 6 (referencing sources arguing both sides of the question). 
 27. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 
1861–2003, at 388–407 app. (2008). 
 28. In fact, Professor Cass Sunstein believes that the Lawrence v. Texas decision that 
declared sodomy laws unconstitutional “is best understood as responsive to what the Court saw 
as an emerging national awareness, reflected in a pattern of nonenforcement, that it is 
illegitimate to punish people because of homosexual conduct—and that the decision therefore 
embodies a kind of American-style desuetude.” Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of 
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 45 (2003). The impact 
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was likely known at the time when new laws of this sort were passed 
and increases the understanding that legislators mainly wanted to scare 
and send a symbolic message to persons engaged in acts of sodomy 
rather than directly punish them for their behavior. Indeed, Professor 
William Eskridge explains that “police rarely enforced sodomy laws 
against anyone before 1880, even when such illegal activities were 
notorious in the community,”29 and “sodomy laws were understood, in 
the nineteenth century, primarily as instruments to regulate sexual 
assault.”30 This pattern changed somewhat for a period of time, 
however, when states expanded the scope of these laws to include oral 
sex, and the number of arrests for sodomy greatly increased.31 Once 
sodomy laws were no longer enforced due to changing mores, they still 
created numerous problems. For one, individuals who were previously 
prosecuted continued to bear significant stigma as registered sex 
offenders despite the fact that their consensual homosexual acts took 
place potentially dozens of years earlier.32 Professor William Stuntz 
also notes that for crimes of vice, enforcement must necessarily be 
selective because it is impossible to police all such behavior.33 As a 
result, who gets caught is largely a function of where the police decide 
to investigate.34 While the law itself may not specifically discriminate 
against particular people, police and prosecutors can choose their 
targets, which may lead to more unfairness when the choices depend on 
specific attributes of offenders such as race or class.35 Even after 
                                                                                                                     
that Lawrence will have on some other generally unenforced criminal laws in the area of sexual 
relationships, such as those pertaining to adultery, remains uncertain. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, 
Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 543 (1995) (describing the status of 
criminal laws against adultery historically and in modern America); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The 
Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
837, 845, 851–61 (2006) (discussing the possible effects of Lawrence on criminal laws against 
adultery and stating that they remain on the books in close to half of all American states). 
 29. ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 21; see also RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY 
OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 51 n.9 (1988) (“Sodomy laws are very rarely enforced against 
consenting adults in clearly private environs.”). 
 30. ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 20. 
 31. Id. at 55–56; see also JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE 
MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, at 49–51 (1983) 
(describing arrests and police harassment of homosexual individuals in the 1950s). 
 32. Robert L. Jacobson, “Megan’s Laws” Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay Police 
Harassment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2431, 2460 (1999). These examples also show how laws that are 
generally no longer enforced can still interact with laws that are enforced (such as registration 
for sex offenders) and have a negative effect on the lives of those who violate the unenforced 
laws. See id. 
 33. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1875 (2000). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. at 1880. 
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criminal prosecutions ceased, sodomy laws continued to stigmatize 
homosexual individuals and kept them worried that any sexual 
encounter could suddenly result in criminal penalties.36 
While some of the concerns that result from nonenforcement are 
unique to the context of sodomy laws, other issues that relate to 
nonenforcement arise generally. As Christopher Leslie states: 
“Unenforced laws need not be repealed, the argument goes, because 
they are harmless. Unfortunately, this reasoning can lull legislators and 
the electorate into unwarranted complacency.”37 A person’s knowledge 
that she is committing an illegal act often produces some degree of fear 
and anxiety. It potentially exacerbates her relations with law 
enforcement and leads to avoidance behaviors that could put her at risk 
of various harms. For example, many people (in fact, quite possibly the 
majority of Americans)38 would place smoking marijuana in the 
category of behaviors that should not lead to legal sanctions. Currently, 
a victim of a violent crime who was smoking marijuana at the time of 
the incident is probably less likely to contact the police, even if she 
experiences continued risk of some level of bodily harm and although 
the odds of a marijuana-related prosecution of such a victim are likely 
low.39 The risk of underreporting in such situations may be heightened 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by 
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 128 (2000) (noting that despite 
the modern assumption “that the abuses of the 1950s and 1960s are relics, the persecution of gay 
people continues today”). For a discussion and empirical study related to the social effects of 
criminal sodomy laws in South Africa, see generally Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement 
Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643 (2001). 
 37. Leslie, supra note 36, at 103. 
 38.  In a recent poll, 58% of Americans were in favor of the legalization of pot nationwide 
and 39% were in favor of keeping it illegal. Ariel Edwards-Levy, Pot Legalization Support at 
Record High, Poll Finds, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 4, 2012 5:57 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/04/pot-legalization_n_2240257.html. Other figures 
suggest that nine out of ten adults in the United States believe that people who possess or 
consume small amounts of marijuana should not go to jail, and 85% of polled voters support 
therapeutic use of marijuana. See Allen St. Pierre & Paul Armentano, Americans Agree: 
Marijuana Shouldn’t Be Criminalized, CNN (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/09/opinion/st-pierre-armentano-marijuana/index.html.  
 39. This is particularly disconcerting in light of the fact that in 2003, as many as 18% of 
the urine samples that rape treatment centers across the United States submitted for testing in 
cases of suspected drug-facilitated rape tested positive for marijuana, which suggests a fairly 
large involvement for marijuana even for cases that went through some form of reporting. See 
Erica Weir, Drug-Facilitated Date Rape, 165 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 80, 80 (2001) (providing 
statistics regarding drug-facilitated rape). Criminals sometimes prey specifically on individuals 
that they believe are less likely to turn to the police. See, e.g., Jordan Blair Woods, Comment, 
Taking the “Hate” out of Hate Crimes: Applying Unfair Advantage Theory to Justify the 
Enhanced Punishment of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 489, 490 & n.1 (2008) 
(discussing robberies targeting homosexual men who sought out sex in public parks). 
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for populations that already fear the police.40  
The ban on smoking marijuana represents a good example of how 
difficult it can be to change relatively unpopular laws, especially federal 
ones. Forty-two percent of American survey respondents reported that 
they had tried marijuana at least once, which represents double the 
percentage of that present in the more permissive Netherlands and may 
still underestimate the real figure.41 The explanations for this disparity 
between countries are manifold, but one factor may be the reactionary 
posture of individuals who face laws that they consider unjust.42 
America has had a complex relationship with marijuana. At times, parts 
of the country encouraged or mandated the production of hemp, but 
then later initiated state efforts to declare the drug illegal due to its 
association with socially deviant behaviors and with feared Mexican 
immigrants. Eventually the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act effectively 
declared the substance illegal.43 This law included sentences of up to 
$2,000 or five years in prison for certain types of marijuana handling.44 
The sanctions against the use of marijuana rose to a minimum sentence 
of two to ten years with a fine of up to $20,000 in the 1950s. While 
legislators lifted this type of mandatory sentence in the 1970s, the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act enacted in the 1980s included other mandatory sections 
that eventually included a “three strikes and you’re out” provision, 
requiring life sentences for repeat drug offenders of some types.45 The 
number of arrests for marijuana rose from a rate of about two an hour in 
1966 to over eighty an hour in the current era, the equivalent of around 
                                                                                                                     
 40. A number of studies have examined fear of the police and tried to understand the 
factors that contribute to this sentiment. See, e.g., Avdi S. Avdija, The Role of Police Behavior 
in Predicting Citizens’ Attitudes Toward the Police, 6 APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 76 (2010), 
available at http://www.apcj.org/documents/6_2_AvdijaArticle.pdf (stating that police behavior 
is the largest determinant of citizens’ attitudes toward the police and that citizens’ demographic 
characteristics are the second largest).  
 41. Louisa Degenhardt et al., Towards a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis, and 
Cocaine Use: Findings from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED. 
1053, 1057, 1062 (2008). 
 42. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1269–70 
(2011) [hereinafter Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash] (mentioning the war on soft drugs, 
Prohibition laws, and excessive measures against tax evasion as examples of backfiring 
policies); see also Stuntz, supra note 33, at 1872 (explaining that criminalization can achieve the 
opposite of its intended effect and undermine the norms it seeks to promote). 
 43. Marijuana Timeline, PBS: FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/dope/etc/cron.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).  
 44. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, 556.  
 45. Marijuana Timeline, supra note 43. For an explanation of how the Anti-Abuse Act 
works in practice, see Eric E. Sterling, Drug Laws and Snitching: A Primer, PBS: FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/primer (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
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800,000 arrests a year.46 In 2001, marijuana was the primary drug type 
for which judges sentenced 7,758 out of 23,483 offenders (roughly a 
third) under the sentencing guidelines for drug trafficking.47 The high 
overall rate of arrests and relatively high rate of sentencing for 
marijuana offenders is striking when contrasted with public attitudes 
about marijuana. When asked whether marijuana should be made legal, 
respondents answered “yes” 12% of the time in 1969 and 50% in 2011, 
with a progression toward “yes” in a virtually linear fashion during the 
years in-between.48 Strikingly, there were roughly half as many arrests 
for marijuana offenses in the 1970s as there are now even though 
(1) twice as many people want to make marijuana legal today,49 and 
(2) there are about as many new users of marijuana every year now as 
there were in the 1970s.50  While there are a number of different factors 
that may help to explain these statistics, it appears that, overall, 
marijuana laws have experienced both absolute and relative increases in 
enforcement of various sorts despite a potential disconnection between 
these laws and the popular will. Dan Kahan’s explanation for the history 
of marijuana laws is that initially the public supported their tough 
regulation because the existing laws were unable to inhibit the drug 
trade and politicians exploited the increasing fear of drugs.51 At the 
same time, given that “individuals’ condemnation preferences are not 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Paul Armentano, Incarceration Nation—Marijuana Arrests for Year 2009 Near 
Record High, NORML (Sept. 15, 2010), http://blog.norml.org/2010/09/15/incarceration-nation-
marijuana-arrests-for-year-2009-near-record-high. There are also allegations of vast racial 
disparities in marijuana-related arrests, with African-Americans being at a fourfold risk of arrest 
in comparison with Caucasians. See Ian Urbina, Blacks Are Singled Out for Marijuana Arrests, 
Federal Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/us/
marijuana-arrests-four-times-as-likely-for-blacks.html (noting that African-Americans “were 
nearly four times as likely as whites to be arrested on charges of marijuana possession in 2010, 
even though the two groups used the drug at similar rates”). 
 47. Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi, 
82 N.C. L. REV. 621, 714 n.414 (2004) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 68 tbl.33 (2001)). 
 48. HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. AT ALBANY SCH. OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.2.67.2011 (2011), 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2672011.pdf. 
 49. See id.; Armentano, supra note 46, tbl. 
 50. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., RESULTS FROM 2001 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: VOLUME 1. 
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 44, 45 fig.5.1 (2001), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/
data/nhsda/2k1nhsda/PDF/ch5.pdf. A 2012 study states, however, that about 7.3% of Americans 
ages twelve or older reported regular marijuana use, which may represent a slight increase from 
2007 when it was 5.8% (though some suggest that this may simply result from more willingness 
to report such use). Jen Christensen, Regular Marijuana Use on the Rise, Survey Says, CNN 
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/05/health/marijuana-use-rising. 
 51. Kahan, supra note 7, at 632. 
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infinitely adaptable, the steady expansion of criminal punishment at 
some point risks triggering a backlash. . . . [When] the law began to be 
applied to white middle-class college students, members of the social 
mainstream began to object, triggering a self-reinforcing wave of 
opposition.”52 
There are some reasons to believe that changes to marijuana laws 
may finally be on the horizon. In November 2012, after some other 
states failed in similar efforts,53 voters in Washington and Colorado 
legalized the limited use of recreational marijuana for individuals over 
twenty-one years of age,54 which created a conflict with the federal ban 
on marijuana.55 This prompted President Barack Obama to openly state: 
“[A]s it is, the federal government has a lot to do when it comes to 
criminal prosecutions. It does not make sense from a prioritization point 
of view to focus on drug users in a state where the state has said that 
that’s legal.”56 Legalization advocates hope to expand their victories to 
states such as California and Oregon,57 which were among the first to 
permit medical marijuana.58 It appears that even though the federal 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., November 6, 2012, General Election Abstract of Votes, OR. SEC’Y OF STATE, 
available at http://www.oregonvotes.gov/doc/history/nov62012/G12_Abstract.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2014) (indicating the failure of Measure 80, which would have legalized recreational 
marijuana use in Oregon); Official Declaration of the Vote Results on November 2, 2010, State 
Ballot Measures, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-
general/06-official-declaration.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (discussing the defeat of Measure 
19, which would have legalized recreational marijuana use in California). 
 54. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (legalizing marijuana use for persons twenty-
one years of age or older in Colorado); November 06, 2012 General Election Results, WASH. 
SEC’Y OF STATE, available at http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-502-
Concerns-marijuana.html (last updated Nov. 27, 2012) (indicating the passage of Measure 502, 
which legalized recreational marijuana use in Washington).  
 55. For a discussion of the federalism issues that the enforcement of drug laws involves, 
see generally Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783 (2004). 
 56. Valerie Richardson, Obama: Marijuana Enforcement Low Priority for Feds, COLO. 
OBSERVER (Dec. 14, 2012), http://thecoloradoobserver.com/2012/12/obama-marijuana-
enforcement-low-priority; see also Kevin Liptak, Obama Says Marijuana ‘No More Dangerous 
than Alcohol,’ CNN (Jan. 19, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/01/19/ 
obama-says-marijuana-no-more-dangerous-than-alcohol. 
 57. But see sources cited supra note 53. 
 58. Alex Dobuzinskis, Pro-Marijuana Campaign Looks Ahead After 2012 Victories, 
REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/30/us-usa-marijuana-
legalization-idUSBRE8BT09X20121230. For a discussion of the status of medical marijuana, 
see generally K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A 
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 223–26 (2005); Ruth C. Stern & 
J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen’s Race: Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 
27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673 (2009); see also David Frum, Be Afraid of Big Marijuana, CNN 
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/10/opinion/frum-big-marijuana-cv (questioning 
the validity of the diagnoses of a vast percentage of medical marijuana users). 
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government won its legal disputes on medical marijuana and the 
Supreme Court agreed that the federal government could make even 
medicinal use illegal,59 the Executive Branch may be losing interest in 
having fights in states that have declared various forms of marijuana 
legal.60 The Obama Administration recently ordered prosecutors to stop 
listing drug quantities in indictments for low-level cases to avoid the 
imposition of statutory mandatory minimums.61 That being said, the 
federal government has remained slow in actually taking marijuana-
related laws off the books, which perpetuates uncertainty and leaves 
open the possibility that, at least in some states, offenders could still be 
placed in prison for long terms.62  
Last, it bears emphasis in this Section that for some offenses, while 
no ultimate punishment (and thus completed enforcement) results, an 
investigation or arrest—negative events in their own right—may take 
place.63 Enforced or not, laws can create a class of people who self-
                                                                                                                     
 59. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding the validity of the federal 
Controlled Substances Act and holding that “Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for 
medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs 
produced and consumed locally”). 
 60. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to All U.S. Attorneys 3 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (noting that in jurisdictions that legalize marijuana in 
some form with a system for effective regulation and enforcement, “state and local law 
enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-
related activity”). See generally Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a 
bstract_id=2359685 (arguing that it is unconstitutional for the Executive Branch to 
prospectively license prohibited conduct or to cease enforcing, on the basis of policy, federal 
laws for entire categories of offenders). Some have proposed that the Executive Branch could at 
least have the Drug Enforcement Agency reclassify marijuana so it would no longer qualify as a 
Schedule I narcotic. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Obama, Who Evidently Has Not Read the 
Controlled Substances Act, Denies that He Has the Power to Reclassify Marijuana, 
REASON.COM (Jan. 31, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/01/31/obama-who-
evidently-has-not-read-the-con. 
  61. Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-drug-
sentences.html. But see Ilya Somin, Obama Opposed to Changing Legal Status of Marijuana 
“at this Point,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 22, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.volokh.com/20 
13/08/22/obama-opposed-to-marijuana-legalization-at-this-point (expressing skepticism as to 
the steps taken by the Obama Administration with regard to the legalization of marijuana and 
stating that federal targeting of medical marijuana use has increased in this Administration). 
  62. This issue continues to develop, and there is at least some interest in changes on both 
sides of the political aisle. See, e.g., David Weigel, Forgive and Forget, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/02/republicans_are_favoring_goi
ng_easy_on_drug_offenders_the_young_gop_leaders.html (discussing the split within the 
Republican Party on drug enforcement). 
 63. Professor Christopher R. Leslie describes in his work on homosexual sodomy laws 
 
17
Manta: The High Cost of Low Sanctions
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
174 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
identify as criminals or at least outcasts. This can lead to further 
marginalization and to the commission of more serious crimes.64 This 
should give observers further pause, and it raises the possibility that 
punishment through a suboptimal law could increase the number of 
offenses that society wants to minimize. This effect is unlikely to 
remain limited to the offenders themselves. It could expand to include 
non-offending citizens who still lose respect for the legal system due to 
its unjust treatment of the offenders. 
C.  The Media and the Bias Toward Identifiable Victims 
As the Introduction states, the media plays an important role in 
shaping public perceptions of the law, in part because it has the power 
to turn a statistical victim into an identifiable one. Society is generally a 
lot more willing to expend resources to protect identifiable victims than 
statistical ones.65 While scholars have proposed different possible 
causes for this phenomenon,66 one set of experiments found that “the 
                                                                                                                     
how, for instance, “in solicitation cases, the arrest itself is often the intended punishment.” 
Leslie, supra note 36, at 128–29. 
 64. There may be a psychological slippery slope of unethical or illegal behavior. One 
study found that the simple act of wearing counterfeit sunglasses led individuals to feel less 
authentic and increased the occurrence of unethical behavior on their part as well as their 
likelihood to view others as unethical. Francesca Gino et al., The Counterfeit Self: The 
Deceptive Costs of Faking It, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 712, 717–18 (2010). 
 65. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 21 (1978) (noting 
that “the United States will spend a million dollars to rescue a single, downed balloonist but will 
not appropriate a similar sum to provide shore patrols”); see also Deborah A. Small & George 
Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2003) (observing the same phenomenon). Studies on the value of statistical 
lives (VSL) also affect regulatory decisions, though there is some debate as to the optimal 
calculation mechanisms to do so. See Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting 
and the Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1532–33 (2010) 
(arguing that the current regulatory use of VSL studies undervalues the amount that people are 
willing to pay to prevent mortality risks). There are some situations, however, in which the 
identifiable/identified victim is an unsympathetic one, and the public may treat that victim no 
better or even worse than a statistical victim. See, e.g., Small & Loewenstein, supra, at 14 
(“Victims are victims because they are not responsible for their situation and thus evoke 
sympathy and pity. If, instead, a person in need is considered responsible for their adverse 
situation, then the resulting emotions might instead be anger and disgust.”) (citation omitted). 
 66. One of these explanations is that specific examples influence individuals because they 
are much more vivid than statistical data. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: 
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 44–53 (1980). Another is that 
identifiable victims are ones that a particular set of actions definitely hurts, whereas there is no 
such guarantee for statistical victims. This phenomenon has been dubbed the “certainty effect.” 
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265 (1979) (defining the certainty effect as the phenomenon by which 
people “overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely 
probable”). 
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major cause of the identifiable victim effect is the relative size of the 
reference group compared to the number of people at risk. Identified 
victims constitute their own reference group, 100% of whom will die if 
steps are not taken to save them.”67 Translated into utilitarian terms, 
what may happen is that when observers perform a (formal or informal) 
cost-benefit analysis in situations that involve identifiable victims, they 
tend to focus on only the costs and benefits that pertain to those specific 
victims. Professors Arden Rowell and Lesley Wexler explain that some 
of these trends of discounting victims at the margin may relate to the 
observed phenomenon of “psychic numbing,” which occurs as early as 
when observers begin to think about more than a single victim.68 
There is no reason to believe that this type of thinking restricts itself 
to life or death situations. Most people likely read crime-related news 
stories with the implicit question as to whether the outcome was fair. 
Was the offender caught, and if so, what sentence did he receive? A 
recent tragic example in this context is the gang rape and beating of an 
Indian woman on a New Delhi bus and her subsequent death at a 
Singapore hospital.69 The media widely reported on her plight, and the 
incident led thousands of people to defy a ban on demonstrations and to 
protest the Indian government’s ineffectiveness in its prevention and 
punishment of the rising number of rapes.70 Victims of rape in India 
often do not report the crime because they fear repercussions against 
themselves, so perpetrators frequently go unpunished.71 While this is a 
long-standing issue in India, it is the individual story of a woman 
nicknamed “Damini”—“Lightning” in Hindi—who captured the 
attention of not only the nation, but also of international audiences.72 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,” 
14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 253 (1997); accord David Fetherstonhaugh et al., Insensitivity 
to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
283, 293–95 (1997) (reporting a study in which a majority of respondents exhibited 
“psychophysical numbing” and were willing to spend $10 million to save 100,000 lives out of a 
pool of 290,000 yet agreed to do so to rescue as few as 9,000 lives out of a pool of 15,000). 
 68. Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives 13 (Ill. Pub. Law Research 
Paper No. 13-42, 2013) (quoting Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity, in THE 
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012)), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2240564. 
 69. CNN Staff, Doctor: Young Woman Gang-Raped in India Dies, CNN (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/28/world/asia/india-rape-victim/index.html. 
 70. See Vibhuti Agarwal, Delhi Protesters Defy Ban, Clash over Rape Laws, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2012, 6:05 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323291704578197350453571588 (“The protests reflect the disenchantment 
that the country’s young generation feels toward what they see as India’s failure to protect 
women’s rights.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. CNN Staff, supra note 69. 
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Most major U.S. news outlets featured the developments in the story, 
some even on their front pages.73 Publicized high-level harm against 
one rape victim thus attracted attention in a way that years of mostly 
lower-level yet often still very violent crimes against Indian women 
failed to do.74  
For most crime cases in the press, there is a perpetrator and a victim, 
and the empathy tends to focus on the victim. The reaction is somewhat 
different, however, when society considers the crime “victimless” or 
where, at least, it is unclear if there was any real harm. In those 
situations, the offender can take on the role of victim in the public’s 
mind. The literature on identifiable versus statistical victims may 
provide a partial explanation of why identifiable and identified high-
sanctions stories have a greater impact on public policy than the 
statistical, albeit at times widespread effect of low sanctions.75 The 
tendency of the press to report on stories that involve high sanctions or 
high harm both stems from and sharpens the contrast in the level of 
attention that people pay to different stories, a phenomenon that occurs 
at the potential expense of maximal utility. 
An interesting story in this context is that of speeding in 
Washington, D.C. Nationwide, 89% of polled American drivers admit 
that they have driven faster than the posted speed limit, and 40% state 
that they have exceeded the speed limit by over twenty miles per hour.76 
As a result, when the level of sanctions for speeding changes, many 
                                                                                                                     
 73. See, e.g., India Gang-Rape Victim’s Condition Deteriorates, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 
2012, 12:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/28/indian-rape-victims-
deteriorates/1796235 (reporting in detail the condition of “Damini”); Heather Timmons & 
Sruthi Gottipati, Woman Dies After a Gang Rape that Galvanized India, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/asia/condition-worsens-for-victim-of-gang-
rape-in-india.html (reporting the death of “Damini”). The outrage level increased further when 
the sole juvenile defendant in the case received a sentence of only three years in prison. See 
Tanvi Sharma & Mark Magnier, Teen Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for Fatal Gang Rape 
in India, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-india-
rape-20130831,0,5439549.story. The four adult offenders received the death penalty. Harmeet 
Shah Singh et al., Court Sentences 4 Men to Death in New Delhi Gang Rape Case, CNN (Sept. 
14, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/13/world/asia/india-gang-rape-sentence/index.html. 
 74. See CNN Staff, supra note 69 (discussing the large number of unpublicized claims). 
Another case that surfaced around the same time was that of a seventeen-year-old girl who 
committed suicide after her allegations of gang rape were initially disbelieved. Harmeet Shah 
Singh & Hilary Whiteman, Indian Girl Commits Suicide over Alleged Gang Rape, CNN (Dec. 
30, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/28/world/asia/india-rape-suicide/index.html. 
 75. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 76. New Allstate Survey Shows Americans Think They Are Great Drivers—Habits Tell a 
Different Story, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-
allstate-survey-shows-americans-think-they-are-great-drivers---habits-tell-a-different-story-1265 
63103.html. 
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Americans tend to feel an effect. The District of Columbia recently 
decided to more than double the number of traffic cameras it plans to 
employ, a decision that many people met with a groan as it represents 
an increase in the sanctions that the average speeder can expect to 
suffer.77 Meanwhile, some legislators have proposed reductions in the 
maximum fines that speeders must pay.78 While part of these 
legislators’ rationale has been to reduce the public perception that the 
traffic cameras are a revenue-generating machine rather than a truly 
justifiable safety measure,79 increases in the frequency of enforcement 
and decreases in sanctions may also cleverly serve as a tool against 
social protest of the camera-driven pursuit of speeders.80  
There is no definitive assessment about the public’s opinion on 
speed limits in various localities, but there is some evidence to suggest 
that the public would prefer higher rather than lower limits within a 
reasonable range. One possible indicator is individuals’ large-scale 
willingness to drive faster than the speed limit,81 although there is a 
chance that while they trust their own judgment in choosing to speed, 
they do not trust other people’s judgment and thus they do believe in 
legal punishment for this activity. Another indication is the opposition 
that people can have when a state proposes decreases in the maximum 
speed limit, such as in 2008 when Kansas considered decreasing the 
limit from seventy to sixty-five miles per hour and found that residents 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Alan Blinder, D.C. Traffic Cameras to More Than Double Amid Record Revenues, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 25, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/district-traffic-
cameras-to-more-than-double-amid-record-revenues/article/2516807. 
 78. Martin Austermuhle, D.C. Legislators Propose Dropping Traffic Camera Fines to 
$50, Directing Half of Revenue to Safety Programs, DCIST (Oct. 16, 2012, 10:00 AM), 
http://dcist.com/2012/10/dc_legislators_propose_dropping_tra.php. 
 79. See id. (quoting Councilmember Tommy Wells who stated: “Most people I talk to are 
convinced that our automated traffic enforcement cameras are mostly about raising revenue”); 
DC to Add 134 Traffic Cameras, Will More than Double Traffic-Camera Network, MY 
FOXDC.COM (updated Jan. 23, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.myfoxdc.com/story/20427813/dc-
to-add-134-traffic-cameras-will-more-than-double-traffic-camera-network (“[D]etractors say the 
cameras are driven more by revenue than public safety.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1076 (2001) (discussing, in the context 
of traffic cameras in Washington, D.C., the lower need for high fines if technology facilitates 
frequent enforcement). For an overview of national use of speed and red light cameras, see 
Speed and Red Light Camera Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N (last updated Feb. 
2014), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/auto_enforce.html. 
 80.  See generally EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (analyzing the drawbacks of attempting to solve all 
problems, including legal ones, through technology). 
 81. See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1401–02 
(2002) (discussing how “[m]any drivers, perhaps most drivers, routinely speed” and that “when 
asked, most drivers do not view driving 10 mph over the speed limit as wrong”). 
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opposed the change by more than a five-to-one margin.82 Meanwhile, 
few complained when Texas recently opened a forty-mile stretch of 
highway that has the highest maximum speed limit in the nation at 
eighty-five miles per hour.83  
Given these examples of public behavior and perception regarding 
speed limits, imagine what would have happened if, instead of 
announcing a doubling in the number of cameras targeting speeding 
(accompanied by a potential reduction in the size of fines), Washington, 
D.C. had announced a significant increase in the size of fines. Even if 
the latter actually meant a smaller overall reduction in the population’s 
available private resources, the odds of public protests would have been 
heightened. While the Washington, D.C. area newspapers reported on 
the doubling of the number of traffic cameras,84 the tone and amount of 
coverage was relatively subdued. There is significant reason to suspect 
that high fines would have attracted more calls of injustice and public 
opposition. Had police then enforced such sanctions, the media would 
have soon featured stories about an outrageous fine that a sympathetic 
character who barely exceeded the speed limit had to pay. It is unlikely 
that any newspaper would feature a lot of individualized profiles of 
those who paid $50 as a result of being caught speeding by the traffic 
cameras, regardless of the total size of this group of people.85 
II.  THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT IN COPYRIGHT AND 
RELATED LAWS 
Sanctions have played a key role in the history of copyright law, and 
this Part analyzes how copyright law exemplifies the principle that once 
low sanctions are introduced for an offense, they can grow into large 
sanctions through a combination of increases in penalties and 
enforcement itself.86 Part II also shows the sanctions/injustice matrix 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See Scott Rothschild, Public Opinion Largely Against Lower Speed Limits, 
LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2008/oct/06/
public_opinion_largely_against_lower_speed_limits. 
 83. Ryan Owens & Gina Sunseri, Speeding Through Texas: Going 85 MPH on the 
Nation’s Fastest Highway, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/speeding-
texas-85-mph-highway-opens/story?id=17549839. 
 84. See supra notes 77–79. 
 85. Some of the cities that use traffic cameras have been embroiled in court battles, and a 
court recently deemed Cleveland’s program unconstitutional. Alison Grant, Cleveland Traffic 
Camera System Unconstitutional, Appellate Court Rules, PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/01/cleveland_traffic_camera_syste.html. 
 86. Indeed, this principle is not unique to intellectual property. Over the last few decades, 
for instance, the federal government has repeatedly increased penalties for white-collar crimes, 
which include mail and wire fraud. See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of 
Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2008). 
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from Section I.A. in action and demonstrates how recent popular and 
legislative behavior, in addition to the latest empirical data, suggest that 
a step beyond a critical threshold level of sanctions can lead to uprisings 
that have legal impact. Last, it illustrates, through the events that 
surrounded Aaron Swartz’s legal case and his death, how prosecutors 
can stack up counts and intimidate defendants with sanctions that may 
exceed the level that legislators and the population at large considered 
appropriate when the original related bills were passed. 
A.  The Evolution of Sanctions in Copyright Law 
Having delineated the history of criminal sanctions in copyright law 
in past work,87 this Article focuses on only a brief sketch here and says 
a few words about civil sanctions. Traditionally, the distinctions 
between civil and criminal sanctions are that criminal sanctions 
generally impose a higher level of social stigma, can lead to the 
temporary or permanent loss of rights such as voting, affect future 
employability, erode family structures, and carry more significant 
psychological harm to offenders.88 These effects militate for special 
attention to new criminal legislation even when it contains low 
sanctions, but a number of the phenomena that this Article describes 
apply to civil sanctions as well. Furthermore, the distinction between 
civil and criminal law is so blurred in a variety of contexts89 that the 
possibility of a focus solely on criminal law is precluded. 
Over a hundred years passed between the enactment of America’s 
first copyright legislation and the implementation of criminal sanctions 
for related offenses.90 As time progressed, criminal liability expanded to 
more offenses and the sanctions grew in size.91 The expansions and 
increases were varied; they extended coverage to sound recordings, 
shifted criminal liability from the realm of misdemeanors to felonies, 
added infringement against software products, included some types of 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property 
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 481–85 (2011). 
 88. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2005) (discussing the social and psychological effects that a felony 
criminal conviction may have on an individual). 
 89. See id. at 4 n.6 (citing to several sources agreeing with this point). 
 90. Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of 
Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 835, 840 (1999). 
 91. See Manta, supra note 87, at 481–84 (tracking the history of criminal sanctions for 
copyright infringement); Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory 
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 780–84 (2001) 
(discussing how the “term, scope, and power of copyright law has steadily increased over the 
years”). 
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not-for-profit infringement, provided for stricter application of 
sentencing guidelines, made copyright counterfeiting a racketeering 
activity, and increased punishments for repeat copyright infringers, 
among other changes.92 The shift from misdemeanor to felony liability 
occurred because the motion picture and sound recording industries 
successfully lobbied Congress and gained support for the arguments that 
civil lawsuits failed to deter sophisticated infringers and that “the 
modest penalties prescribed under then-existing law tended to 
discourage criminal enforcement efforts. U.S. Attorneys confronted 
with a wide range of possible prosecutions clearly preferred the 
prospect of almost any felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction 
for copyright infringement.”93 
For a long time, the trend toward ever-increasing sanctions and 
enforcement seemed unstoppable. A combination of factors—including 
the perceived need to stop infringers armed with increasingly powerful 
technologies and the strong unity among copyright owners who lobbied 
for intellectual property maximalism—expanded the boundaries of the 
law one bill at a time.94 Why did many individuals fail to stand up to 
copyright lobbies until fairly recently if some of these expansions may 
not have served the greater good? It is as true in copyright as in other 
legal areas that “the rational individual in the large group in a socio-
political context will not be willing to make any sacrifices to achieve 
the objectives he shares with others. There is accordingly no 
presumption that large groups will organize to act in their common 
interest.”95 In short, it is likely that people did not believe the pain was 
worth the gain.  
One interesting turn of events took place when the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) and other organizations started 
to litigate more intensively against individuals who made illegal copies 
of songs on the Internet. Unsatisfied by victories against the hosts of 
peer-to-peer networking and other technologies that facilitate the illegal 
copying of music files, the RIAA and related entities began pursuing 
some of the individuals who engaged in copying.96 These lawsuits took 
strategic advantage of the provisions in copyright law that allow courts 
to award plaintiffs statutory damages in the amount of $750 to $150,000 
                                                                                                                     
 92. See Manta, supra note 87, at 481–85. 
 93. Mary Jane Saunders, Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Copyright Felony Act, 
71 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 675 (1994). 
 94. See Bell, supra note 91, at 781–84, 786 (attributing the expansion of copyright law in 
part to an effective intellectual property lobby).  
 95. OLSON, supra note 3, at 166–67. 
 96. See, e.g., infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text. 
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per infringed work.97 The Copyright Act of 1909 introduced statutory 
damages to address cases in which damages were difficult to compute,98 
but the law originally stated that they “shall not be regarded as a 
penalty.”99 When the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed, however, it 
omitted this language, which led some commentators and at least one 
court to suggest that statutory sanctions took a more punitive nature at 
that stage.100 During the debate over whether to pass the Digital Theft 
Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999 and 
approve its accompanying raise in both minimum and maximum 
statutory sanctions, Representative Howard Coble spoke openly about 
how the goal of increasing statutory sanctions was to “deter copyright 
infringement.”101 It is clear that (1) these sanctions had come a long way 
from being simply necessary tools in a world where determining 
damages was so complex that prescribed sums would help, and (2) they 
now contained a punitive aspect that sought to discourage future 
wrongdoing. 
Plaintiffs like the RIAA and their attorneys saw a unique opportunity 
in the existence of statutory damages because it is easy to find 
defendants who have downloaded or shared a significant number of 
songs and have done so willfully.102 These do not tend to be cases of 
                                                                                                                     
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). For a discussion of statutory copyright damages, see 
generally J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-
Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright 
Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004) (discussing the large statutory awards that copyright 
law permits and how most defendants choose to settle rather than face those large damages); 
Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory Damage 
Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53–63 (2009) (discussing whether 
excessively large statutory damage awards in copyright cases are constitutional); Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of 
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009) (discussing the plaintiff’s option to receive an 
award of statutory damages at any time before the final judgment in copyright cases).  
 98. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 97, at 446 n.22. 
 99. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 504 
(2012)), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf. 
 100. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 97, at 460–61. But see generally H. Tomás 
Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About US Copyright Law and Statutory Damages, 
5 W.I.P.O.J. 76 (2013) (providing historical background on why the statutory sanctions may not 
have become more punitive in 1976 despite this omission). Note that in some cases, lost profits 
may potentially exceed statutory damages. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 
No. 07 Civ. 8822(HB), 2010 WL 3629587, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (awarding $6,585,000 
where the judge estimated actual damages at $17,560,000). 
 101. 145 CONG. REC. 30,636, 30,785 (1999). 
 102. Willful infringement is, as one would intuitively expect, the type accompanied by the 
highest statutory damages per infringed work. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (allowing up to 
$150,000 in statutory awards). Some scholars have suggested, however, that the tripartite 
structure that Congress created through the Copyright Act of 1976, which calibrated sanctions to 
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accidental infringement of one work against another similar work;103 
rather, defendants illegally download exact copies because they are free. 
In one of the best-known cases of this kind, a federal district court 
ordered a Minnesota woman named Jammie Thomas to pay $1.92 
million in damages for the willful illegal sharing of twenty-four 
copyrighted songs.104 After further procedural steps in the litigation, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the decision but 
did order Thomas to pay $222,000,105 which remains an exorbitant sum 
for an infringement that amounted to “the equivalent of approximately 
three CDs, costing less than $54.”106 Some news outlets began referring 
to her as the “download martyr” as a result.107 Another case involved 
Boston University student Joel Tenenbaum, whom a federal district 
court sentenced to pay $675,000 for illegally sharing thirty songs.108 
After a protracted court battle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that this sentence should stand and that it does not violate 
Tenenbaum’s due process rights.109 Some may question why juries are 
willing to award such large amounts if these amounts are out of step 
with societal norms and expectations. Dan Kahan argues on this subject 
that, up to a certain point, “the desire of most decisionmakers to carry 
out their legal obligations is likely to dominate their personal 
commitment to the norm.”110 While this phenomenon applies to both 
                                                                                                                     
the level of moral culpability of infringers, “has devolved into a regime in which the innocent 
infringer provision is essentially never used, and willful infringement is commonly found in 
cases when infringement should properly be deemed ordinary.” Samuelson & Wheatland, supra 
note 97, at 460. 
 103. For a discussion of non-willful copyright infringement, see generally Irina D. Manta, 
Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1331–36 (2012) (analyzing different tests for 
determining whether a work is “substantially similar” and the problems that arise in applying 
such a standard). 
 104. Greg Sandoval, Jammie Thomas Asks for New Trial, CNET (July 6, 2009, 3:28 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10280531-93.html. 
 105. Greg Sandoval, Appeals Court Sides with RIAA, Jammie Thomas Owes $222,000, 
CNET (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57510453-93/appeals-
court-sides-with-riaa-jammie-thomas-owes-$222000. 
 106. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (2008). 
  107. See, e.g., Nick Pinto, Jammie Thomas-Rasset: The Download Martyr, CITY PAGES 
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.citypages.com/2011-02-16/news/jammie-thomas-rasset-the-
download-martyr. 
 108. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89 (D. Mass. 2009), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 109. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013). For a criticism 
of the decision to impose such high sanctions against Tenenbaum in the name of societal 
deterrence, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Lost Logic of Deterrence: When ‘Sending a Message’ to 
the Masses Outstrips Fairness, COGNOSCENTI (July 11, 2013), http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2013/ 
07/11/joel-tenenbaum-wendy-gordon. 
 110. Kahan, supra note 7, at 644. 
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criminal and civil sanctions, it is especially true for civil cases.111 
While juries were thus unwilling to nullify the laws that imposed 
statutory sanctions, the public at large did not appreciate the fact that the 
awards against Thomas and Tenenbaum far exceeded anything that the 
single mother and the graduate student could afford to pay.112 Further, 
Tenenbaum launched a public relations campaign to protest the situation 
and created a website that distributes information about his case, 
collects money to defray his costs, and gathers the stories of some of the 
30,000 individuals who settled their cases with entertainment companies 
for amounts between $3,000 and $12,000.113 Other cases involved the 
RIAA suing defendants such as a family that did not own a computer, a 
teenager,114 a homeless man,115 and a dead grandmother.116 
In addition to the cases directly related to file sharing, around the 
time of the SOPA/PIPA discussion, a high-profile story made the 
rounds on the Internet about the threatened extradition to the United 
States of a British college student named Richard O’Dwyer who ran a 
website that posted links to pirated movies and TV shows.117 O’Dwyer 
faced ten years in American jail for his activities, though he ultimately 
                                                                                                                     
 111. See id. at 642 (explaining that decision makers “are likely to experience less aversion 
to enforcing civil remedies, which tend to be milder both in their regulatory incidence and in 
their social meaning; yet as they become accustomed to enforcing civil sanctions, 
decisionmakers are likely to become progressively more condemnatory of the underlying 
conduct and thus more supportive of punitive measures at a later time”). In the realm of criminal 
sanctions, scholars have discussed how legislators must respect the principle of “fair labeling” 
in an effective legal system that seeks to ensure compliance across various actors. This means 
that laws must signal the distinctions between both different types of offenses and 
their magnitudes. See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 52–54 (2012) (discussing fair labeling and the law’s obligation to “punish 
the more blameworthy act more severely and the less blameworthy act less severely”). For 
another take on the issue of gradations in the law, see generally Adam J. Kolber, Smooth 
and Bumpy Laws, 102 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992034. 
 112. See Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1265 (noting the “public 
sentiment that the awards are disproportionate and excessive”). 
 113. JOEL FIGHTS BACK, available at http://archive.is/2G6Rg  (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
For a brief history of these types of cases, see Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 
42, at 1259–63. 
 114. Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues Computer-Less Family, 234 Others, for File Sharing, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2006, 2:47 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2006/04/6662-2. 
 115. Jamie Lendino, RIAA Sues Homeless Man, After Deciding Dead Grandmother Wasn’t 
Enough, SOCIAL TIMES (Apr. 21, 2008, 11:24 AM), http://socialtimes.com/riaa-sues-homeless-
man-after-deciding-dead-grandmother-wasnt-enough_b1662. 
 116. Eric Bangerman, “I Sue Dead People...,” ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 4, 2004, 4:43 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/02/4587-2.  
 117. Peter Walker, ‘Piracy’ Student Loses US Extradition Battle over Copyright 
Infringement, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jan/13/
piracy-student-loses-us-extradition. 
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struck a deal in November 2012 to avoid both extradition and jail 
time.118 The O’Dwyer saga added to the perception that the media 
companies have a lot of power and can reach even individuals abroad 
who may not have violated their own local laws.119  
Due to a number of factors including the suffering public relations 
image of entertainment companies as a result of such lawsuits, which 
this Article analyzes further in Section II.B, and the large amounts spent 
on legal fees versus sums recovered,120 the record companies decided to 
mostly cease their legal efforts. At one point, these companies set up a 
settlement website. The goal of the site was for college students who 
infringed copyright laws whose universities disclosed their information 
and for users whose data was revealed by Internet service providers to 
enter into settlements for a few thousand instead of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.121 At the time of this writing, that website is no 
longer functional,122 and questions remain as to whether the 
entertainment companies have genuinely forsaken the initiation of new 
cases. 
B.  The Public’s Reaction to Copyright Enforcement and to Varying 
Levels of Sanctions 
Historically, intellectual property laws were not a subject that 
angered much of the population. There were occasional battles on the 
subject, but most of them took place on a fairly small scale.123 The 
subject became truly heated when America turned into a “nation of 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Dasha Afanasieva, UK Student Escapes U.S. Extradition in Copyright Case, REUTERS 
(Nov. 28, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/28/net-us-britain-usa-
tvshack-idUSBRE8AR0VE20121128. 
 119. See Walker, supra note 117 (discussing that according to his lawyers, O’Dwyer’s 
website acted as little more than a “[G]oogle-type search engine”); see also Somini Sengupta, 
U.S. Pursuing a Middleman in Web Piracy, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/technology/us-pursues-richard-odwyer-as-intermediary-in-
online-piracy.html (noting the entertainment industry’s stringent effort to pass SOPA). 
 120. Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha. RIAA Paid Its Lawyers More Than $16,000,000 in 
2008 to Recover Only $391,000!!!, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE PEOPLE (July 13, 2010, 11:26 
AM), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-riaa-paid-its-lawy 
ers.html. 
 121. See Eliot Van Buskirk, A Poison Pen from the RIAA, WIRED (Feb. 28, 2007), 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/02/72834 (discussing the settlement 
process). 
 122. Attempts to access any content at http://www.p2plawsuits.com failed (last visited Feb. 
26, 2014). 
 123. For one example of an early intellectual property conflict, see Adam Mossoff, The 
Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 
ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 165–66 (2011) (analyzing the history of an early patent thicket on sewing 
machine parts). 
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constant infringers.”124 The RIAA warns that in the decade after peer-
to-peer file sharing began with Napster in 1999, music sales in the 
United States dropped 47% from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion, that from 
2004 through 2009, individuals illegally downloaded 30 billion songs 
on file-sharing networks, and that only 37% of the music Americans 
acquired in 2009 was legally purchased.125 The RIAA also notes that 
even though peer-to-peer downloading remained flat over the last few 
years, the use of digital storage lockers to spread illegal music files 
increased.126 Other actors greatly question the economic effects of 
illegal downloads, and a recent report argues that increases in creation 
and revenues exist in virtually every sector of the entertainment 
industry.127 
With the rise in lawsuits by organizations like the RIAA, every 
American that engaged in illegal file sharing—at least 27% of all 
Internet users as of 2005, based on self-reports likely to underestimate 
the true figure128—became a potential target of hefty sanctions. Some 
studies set the figure of the percentage of the population that purchases, 
copies, or downloads unauthorized music, TV shows, or movies at 46%, 
and as high as 70% among 18–29 year olds.129 Had the pattern remained 
one of nonenforcement or of low sanctions, it is very unlikely that the 
public would have mustered the same level of outrage as it did over 
Jammie Thomas’s, Joel Tenenbaum’s, and related cases. Observers 
would have probably both felt less empathy for the defendants of low-
                                                                                                                     
 124. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543. 
 125. For Students Doing Reports, RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N AM., 
http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).  
 126. Id. A recent study suggests that the amount of Internet bandwidth used for illegal 
downloads increased by 160% between 2010 and 2012. Richard Verrier, Online Piracy of 
Entertainment Content Keeps Soaring, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-fi-ct-piracy-bandwith-20130917,0,1 
550997.story. 
 127. MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, FLOOR 64, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK 
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising. Additionally, 2012 apparently set a box-office record for 
Hollywood movies. Scott Bowles, A Happy 2012 for Hollywood as It Sets Box-Office Record, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 26, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2012/
12/25/box-office-christmas-avengers/1790601. 
 128. MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSIC AND VIDEO 
DOWNLOADING MOVES BEYOND P2P 1 (2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/
media/Files/Reports/2005/PIP_Filesharing_March05.pdf.pdf. 
 129. JOE KARAGANIS, AM. ASSEMBLY, COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE US, 2 (Nov. 2011), available at http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/AA-Research-Note-Infringement-and-Enforcement-November-
2011.pdf. 
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sanctions cases and been less concerned about the issue from a self-
interested point of view. Even though the copyright owners could argue 
that they were simply exerting their rights, the public viewed such 
enforcement as an unjust power dynamic and saw the settlements as 
characteristic of blackmail or harassment that lacked legitimacy, 
resulted in random enforcement, and entailed disproportionate and 
excessive awards in court.130  
But the RIAA had a number of reasons not to want low sanctions, as 
it believed that these would not provide the same type of large-scale 
deterrence it envisioned from high sanctions and because recovering 
low sanctions from each suit would have done even less to offset the 
significant legal costs that the organization incurred with each suit. 
While the RIAA was mostly unable to realize its goals, its position at 
the time held some intuitive appeal to its members in light of the level 
of financial investment that each lawsuit represented. Ben Depoorter 
and his coauthors studied the matter and found that high sanctions 
generated the greatest amount of backlash against copyright owners 
even if subjects were indeed less likely to download if faced with high 
sanctions and a low probability of getting caught as opposed to low 
sanctions and a high probability of getting caught.131 It appears that 
study subjects who qualified as frequent downloaders were the most 
sensitive to high sanctions both in terms of behavioral measures and 
their expressed intention to increase their downloading if given an 
opportunity to do so in a risk-free manner.132 Annemarie Bridy notes 
that, as Depoorter and his coauthors’ study suggests, the fear of 
lawsuits indeed did not lead to a linear decrease in actual illegal 
downloading behaviors after an initial dip, the reason being that the 
threat of litigation “[rang] hollow for the millions of file sharers 
who continued to share copyrighted material without permission (or 
reprisal).”133 Part of the problem is the disconnection between norms 
and the law, and the fact that harsh enforcement tactics can encourage 
distaste against copyright altogether and prove counterproductive in the 
quest to decrease infringement.134 This issue is likely to be exacerbated 
                                                                                                                     
 130. Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1265–66. 
 131. Id. at 1281–83. 
 132. Id. One of the difficult choices that the entertainment industry has had to make is 
whether to pursue only the largest-scale offenders (thus drawing less disapproval but reducing 
overall deterrence) or a cross section of offenders, which attracts more controversy. Id. at 1283–
84. 
 133. Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in the Decade 
After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 604 (2009). 
 134. See Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against 
Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1158, 1161 (2005) (warning against the danger of 
“strong-armed enforcement tactics”); see also Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 
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by the fact that 83% of teenagers between thirteen and seventeen years 
of age believe that there is nothing morally wrong with file sharing.135 
Generally speaking, whether a person complies with a law is greatly 
influenced by not only whether the penalty for breaking the law is high 
or low, but also whether she agrees with the law.136 At the same time, a 
person’s perceptions about the threat of sanctions can change depending 
on whether the person actually engages in the criminal activity and what 
the consequences of those crimes are.137 One study of high school 
students found that whether he was caught in the past himself and 
whether his peers were caught for their behavior influenced an 
individual’s beliefs about his future likelihood of being caught for a 
crime.138 Both this study and others like it tend to confirm the 
deterrence theory of punishment.139 The combination of knowledge 
                                                                                                                     
42, at 1280 (noting that “[r]aising the level of both severity and certainty of enforcement 
produced a potentially powerful counterproductive effect”). Years before these particular IP 
battles, Professor Tom Tyler stated that “reliance upon threats of punishment to enforce 
intellectual property laws is a strategy that is likely to be ineffective.” Tom R. Tyler, 
Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 219, 234 (1996–97). Other countries have shared some of these experiences, with a 
backlash finally leading to a legislative change in France that removed the sanction of cut-off 
Internet access after three instances of copyright infringement. See Stephen Shankland, French 
Three-Strikes Law No Longer Suspends Net Access, CNET (July 10, 2013), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57593000-93/french-three-strikes-law-no-longer-suspends-n 
et-access/?part=rss&subj=news&tag=readMore. See generally Rebecca Giblin, Evaluating 
Graduated Response, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 147 (2014) (criticizing the international lack of 
success of graduated responses to copyright infringement). 
 135. Steve Hanway & Linda Lyons, Teens OK with Letting Music Downloads Play, 
GALLUP (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/9373/teens-letting-music-downloads-
play.aspx. 
 136. See Caroline Virginia Anderson, Are Fines Fine? A Mixed Methods Study of the 
Effectiveness of and Attitudes to Overdue Fines Among Various Borrower Groups (Age, 
Gender, Ethnicity, Student Status, Faculty and Degree) of the University of Canterbury Library 
(June 2008) (unpublished M.L.I.S. thesis, Victoria University) (on file with Kelburn Library, 
Victoria University of Wellington), available at http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/files/news/
AndersonCINFO580ResearchReport.pdf (discussing the extent to which fines deter library book 
borrowers from keeping books past their due dates). For a discussion of the relationship between 
criminal law and the average individual’s perceptions of justice, see Paul H. Robinson, Why 
Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative 
Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1839–40 (2000) (arguing that the credibility of a criminal 
code depends on the public’s perception of its level of justice). 
 137. Greg Pogarsky et al., Modeling Change in Perceptions About Sanctions Threats: The 
Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 343, 364–65 
(2004). 
 138. Id. at 364–66. 
 139. See id.; accord Ross L. Matsueda et al., Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice 
Model of Theft and Violence, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 95, 100–03 (2006) (noting that a person 
generally makes rational choices based on the risk of arrest as derived from prior perceptions 
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from these studies and from Depoorter and his coauthors’ work suggests 
the following: the decision to infringe could vary depending on the 
salience of the risk of being caught and experiencing high sanctions, 
and this salience was increased in the Depoorter study compared to the 
real world where individuals only occasionally encounter stories of 
enforcement. Indeed, while cases like Thomas’s and Tenenbaum’s may 
be enough to stir outrage, when it comes to individual behavior, these 
stories could prove insufficient to overcome the fact that most people do 
not know even one person who has ever been in trouble for 
unauthorized file sharing. The probability of being caught for file 
sharing may, for better or for worse, be perceived as so low by many 
people that they will continue to flaunt the law. 
Many people follow laws because “it is the right thing to do.”140 This 
preexisting belief, plus the costs and benefits of abiding by a specific 
law, affect the effectiveness of the law and its enforcement. People 
frequently disobey a law if it conflicts with their beliefs of what is just 
and legitimate.141 In fact, an excessive sanction can reaffirm a person’s 
belief that the law is unjust or a lawmaker is illegitimate142 and may 
encourage a person to engage in the illegal behavior even more because 
of its conformance with the individual’s own normative beliefs.143 
When the law no longer has a deterrent effect, lawmakers may create or 
increase sanctions or may give up on the law or its enforcement.144 This 
all fits well with what one can observe in the context of unauthorized 
file sharing: people have some degree of fear of getting caught after 
they read about high-profile cases like Thomas’s or Tenenbaum’s, but 
they then experience a reduction in fear as time goes by and as they 
focus more on the benefits of file sharing again. This is especially true if 
they do not have moral qualms about file sharing because they do not 
see it as hurting anyone and because they may believe that the 
politicians who passed the laws were in the pockets of the entertainment 
companies.145  
                                                                                                                     
and new information regarding his own arrest or that of his peers, from subjective expected 
psychic rewards, and from perceived opportunities). 
 140. Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1268. 
 141. Id. See generally EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY 
OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 
(2010) (describing the way that violators can improve property and intellectual property laws). 
 142. Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1269. 
 143. Id. at 1270. 
 144. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 1878. 
 145. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that in the patent context, the lobbies of the large IT 
and pharmaceutical companies “have a strong influence on the voting behavior of 
congresspersons, and they have a real influence on the direction of patent reform.” Jay P. Kesan 
& Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1385 
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Matters reached a breaking point between copyright owners and the 
public when congressional legislators introduced a set of bills whose 
goal was to further crack down on Internet-related intellectual property 
offenses. 2011 saw the proposal of the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA)146 in the House of Representatives and of the Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act (PIPA, also known as the PROTECT IP Act)147 in the 
Senate, both of which were put on hold indefinitely after wide-spread 
opposition.148 These bills included provisions that secured the ability to 
obtain (1) court orders to prevent advertisers and banks from financially 
dealing with infringing websites as well as (2) court orders that could 
force Internet Service Providers to block access to websites or force 
search engines such as Google and others to block links to websites that 
infringe copyright laws.149 SOPA also added criminal sanctions for the 
illegal streaming of copyrighted works, with penalties rising up to five 
years’ imprisonment.150 The bills received criticism from numerous 
quarters, such as from intellectual property scholars who criticized the 
“potentially disastrous consequences for the stability and security of the 
Internet’s addressing system, for the principle of interconnectivity that 
has helped drive the Internet’s extraordinary growth, and for free 
expression.”151 
Scholars were not the only ones up in arms, however. As one 
commentator put it: 
[T]he rebels detonated their nuclear option. Wikipedia and 
Reddit, along with other popular websites, went black, 
generating thousands of calls and millions of emails, many 
from constituents who had likely never heard of the 
                                                                                                                     
(2009). It is reasonable to infer that politicians are more likely to succumb to the pressures of 
lobbyists on issues that are of little interest to most citizens, which is traditionally the case for 
patents and, until recently, copyright. Meanwhile, citizens may respond by partially ignoring the 
outcomes of lobbying and violating the resulting laws. See Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 
supra note 42, at 1270 (explaining that “violating an unjust or immoral law might sometimes 
increase utility to an individual, perhaps sufficiently so that it outweighs the costs associated 
with the illegal behavior”). There is also the danger that such unjust laws will create subcultures 
of offenders whose community bonds are counterproductively strengthened when the judicial 
system pursues offenders. Id. at 1286. 
 146. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 147. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 148. See Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-postpones-
piracy-vote.html. 
 149. See H.R. 3261 § 102(c)(2)(A)–(D); S. 968, § 3(d)(B)–(D). 
 150. See H.R. 3261 § 201(a); see also 18 U.S.C. 2319(b)(1) (2006). 
 151. Mark Lemley et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 34 (2011).  
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legislation the day before. Online petitions picked up 
10,000,000 signatures, members of Congress received 
3,000,000 emails and a still-unknown number of phone 
calls. Thirty-four Senators felt obliged to come out publicly 
against the legislation. That night, all four Republican 
candidates condemned the bills during a televised debate.152  
The demise of SOPA and PIPA certainly did not signify an end to the 
powerful lobbying forces in intellectual property.153 Indeed, the 
breakdown of the traditional unity among copyright owners accelerated 
the downfall of the bills,154 and Silicon Valley provided a real opponent 
to the entertainment industry for the first time.155 Regardless, even 
scholars who view the public choice framework as powerful agree that 
the role that the technology companies play does not tell the whole 
story.156 Rather, “[w]hile there was plenty of traditional interest group 
politics at work here, the big story . . . was the great awakening of 
Internet users.”157  
So why did this call to action rise when SOPA/PIPA explicitly did 
not seek to change the contours of substantive intellectual property law? 
The harshness of the sanctions involved, set against a backdrop of the 
content industries’ recent history of causing the imposition of other 
harsh sanctions against the likes of Thomas and Tenenbaum, partly 
caused this activism. To the extent that one considers the many 
successful previous expansions of the scope and duration of copyright 
to have resulted in suboptimal laws,158 however, concerns remain that 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Larry Downes, Who Really Stopped SOPA, and Why?, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012, 1:15 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/01/25/who-really-stopped-sopa-and-why. 
 153. For a discussion of the history and role of public choice factors in copyright 
lawmaking, see generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 
OR. L. REV. 275 (1989). 
 154. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 155. Yochai Benkler, Seven Lessons from SOPA/PIPA/Megaupload and Four Proposals on 
Where We Go from Here, TECHPRESIDENT (Jan. 25, 2012), https://techpresident.com/ 
news/21680/seven-lessons-sopapipamegaupload-and-four-proposals-where-we-go-here; see also 
David Post, What the Hell Happened? The Campaign Against (and Defeat of) SOPA, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/17/happened-bring-
sopas-downfall (analyzing the factors that led to the downfall of SOPA). 
 156. See supra note 155; see also Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and the Public 
Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering 1–2 (Aug. 19, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2131865. 
 157. Downes, supra note 152; see also Benkler, supra note 155; Lev-Aretz, supra note 
156. One news article mused that the SOPA/PIPA incident “quite possibly ushered in a new age 
of Web activism.” Doug Gross, The Top 10 Tech ‘Fails’ of 2012, CNN (Jan. 4, 2013, 5:21 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/28/tech/web/tech-fails-2012/index.html. 
 158. There have been critical empirical examinations, for instance, of whether increases in 
scope or sanctions truly lead to increased creativity as the traditional copyright incentives story 
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the popular uprising during the SOPA/PIPA battle may not fully 
translate to future intellectual property contexts. Individuals’ 
willingness and ability to expend emotions and resources on political 
issues is limited. Hence, even with the many additional resources 
available for political activism, such as social networking,159 the next 
bill that proposes an extension of copyright terms or proposes new 
sanctions for existing violations may not lead to the same kind of 
mobilization. The lower the sanctions that bills carry, the more likely 
they are to slip through the cracks.  
Relatedly, the fact of the matter is that individuals’ views on what is 
ethical in the punishment of copyright offenses is directly tied to the 
level of sanctions imposed. While, in a survey on Internet use and 
copyright infringement, “[v]ery few think it is reasonable to upload 
copies to websites where anyone can download them (16%), post links 
to illegal copies on websites such as Facebook (8%) or sell illegal 
copies (6%),”160 only 52% believed that individuals should ever face 
punishment for downloading illegal songs or movies on websites or 
through file-sharing services.161 Among the people that supported 
penalties, the vast majority supported warnings and fines, but a bit 
fewer than half wanted limitations on speed or functionality of Internet 
service and just about a quarter supported disconnecting offending users 
altogether; only 20% supported jail time.162 Of the 16% of the overall 
surveyed population that supported disconnection, over half favored 
periods that were either less than a month (25%) or less than a year 
(34%).163 Of the people who approved of fines, 75% limited that 
support to amounts under $100, which is significantly below the current 
statutory penalties for copyright infringement.164  
Not only were individual opinions thus calibrated to the specific 
level of punishment, but they were also strongly swayed depending on 
                                                                                                                     
argues. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An 
Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73, 1704 (2009) 
(noting that laws increasing criminal penalties had an effect on creativity, as measured by the 
number of copyright registrations in a given time period, only in six out of twenty-three 
instances, four of which were increases and two decreases); MASNICK & HO, supra note 127, at 
2, 4 (showing that the entertainment industry made great economic strides despite the existence 
of large-scale copyright infringement). 
 159. See Lev-Aretz, supra note 156, at 4–5. 
 160. KARAGANIS, supra note 129, at 5. 
 161. Id. at 6. 
 162. Id. Of course, this meant that—viewing the entire surveyed group rather than just 
those in favor of penalties—only half support warnings and fines of any sort, 28% support limits 
on Internet use, and only 16% approve of disconnection from the Internet for individuals (and 
over half of this 16% would refuse to support disconnection if it extended to households). Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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how the survey questions were phrased,165 particularly when the 
questions gave the sense that blocking infringement was “easy” as 
opposed to “messy.”166 This likely suggests that the particular portrayal 
of copyright issues in the media may have an especially significant 
influence on individuals’ perceptions and willingness to take political 
action. The landscape of Americans’ opinions may have compounded 
the effect of the media to reinforce people’s biases toward identifiable 
victims and away from statistical ones in the copyright context. The 
high sanctions against Thomas, Tenenbaum, and others, and the stories 
of extradition tied to copyright infringement, as pitted against an 
entertainment industry that may or may not suffer real economic harm 
depending on whose empirical data one believes, created identifiable 
victims out of the copyright infringers. The introduction of SOPA/PIPA 
unleashed the public’s wrath because it combined high sanctions with a 
degree of individual fear of the possible consequences. If statutory 
damages could affect a mom in Minnesota or a student in 
Massachusetts, might SOPA/PIPA’s sanctions not also have an impact 
on any other average individual?167 
In a sense, one could view the SOPA/PIPA battle as a public success 
and as evidence that perhaps low sanctions are not so disastrous if a 
backlash can halt their increase. The story of low sanctions is, however, 
more complicated than that. First, we see in many areas, such as the 
example of drug laws that this Article discusses above,168 that the public 
can become unwilling or unable to stop increases in sanctions even if, 
by most accounts, these implicate more harm than good and even if the 
public would not have deemed the increased sanctions acceptable upon 
passage of the initial bills.169 Second, focusing on copyright alone, 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Naturally, the ability of survey questions to influence responses is a well-known 
phenomenon not limited to this context. 
 166. KARAGANIS, supra note 129, at 10. 
 167. One could argue that this may show only that while the public finds the making of 
unauthorized copies on the Internet unjust and favors low sanctions, it does not support high 
sanctions. Even if that is the case, the question becomes whether the public would have agreed 
to laws against such copying if it had known how large the sanctions would later grow and how 
difficult it would be to stop that growth. It is far from certain that society would have entered 
this bargain. 
 168. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 169. That being said, there are situations in which a society and its legislature see the need 
to raise sanctions if the initial low ones are not as effective as legislators initially believed. My 
statement refers specifically to situations in which the public, even with the benefit of hindsight 
about the effect of the low sanctions, would not agree to go back and pass the bill with higher 
sanctions if it could. There is no fail-proof method to ascertain whether an increase in sanctions 
stems from legitimate policy reasons versus phenomena such as lobbying. Some of the ways to 
protect against the latter are initial skepticism toward any increases, thorough discussion in the 
media and other public forums, and inquiries into the extent to which the general public or, in 
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while the SOPA/PIPA legislation was stopped, the sanctions previously 
imposed against Thomas, Tenenbaum, and others remain. Also, the high 
statutory sanctions of copyright stay on the books without clear 
empirical backing and with easily observable potential harms. The 
SOPA/PIPA battle harnessed highly specific forces whose presence 
cannot be assumed in future copyright contexts that have a bit less 
pervasive yet still important repercussions.  
Indeed, some do not view it as a coincidence that the federal 
government cracked down on the file-sharing site Megaupload just one 
day after the most significant demonstrations against SOPA, especially 
given that there is  
a large number of functionaries throughout the federal 
government, most importantly the Justice Department’s 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, a White 
House IP czar, and an IPR Center housed in the 
Department of Homeland Security, whose professional 
success, irrespective of the policy position of any given 
administration, [is] measured by (a) how threatening we 
think Piracy is, and (b) how many large prosecutions they 
are able to bring.170  
In January 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) both shut down and 
seized Megaupload assets in Hong Kong and New Zealand and caused 
some of the individuals who ran the site to spend a month in prison 
abroad and live under threat of extradition to the United States, all under 
a theory of contributory copyright infringement that many 
commentators malign.171 Not only did the Megaupload enforcement 
occur right after the SOPA protests, but questions also exist about the 
relationship between Aaron Swartz’s activism against SOPA and the 
DOJ’s decision to prosecute him harshly.172  
                                                                                                                     
some situations, experts agree with the proposed measures. All of this militates for a significant 
period of time that should normally pass between when a sponsor first introduces a bill that 
involves a sanction increase and when it receives a vote, given that the dangers of crisis 
legislation could overshadow careful consideration and lead to temporary outliers in what 
constitutes average public opinion. For the general hazards of crisis legislation, see Romano, 
supra note 9. 
 170. Benkler, supra note 155. 
 171. See id.; Toby Manhire, Kim Dotcom: The Internet Cult Hero Spoiling for a Fight with 
US Authorities, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/jan/
18/kim-dotcom-fight-internet-freedom; see also Eric Goldman, Comments on the Megaupload 
Prosecution (a Long-Delayed Linkwrap), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2012, 9:30 
AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/04/megaupload.htm (doubting that the U.S. 
government has a case at all due to repeated legal mistakes). 
 172. See infra Section II.C. 
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C.  The Prosecution and Death of Aaron Swartz 
No account of the role of sanctions in the world of intangible 
property would be complete without an analysis of the high-profile case 
of computer coder and Internet activist Aaron Swartz.173 A technology 
prodigy, Swartz became involved in the development of the RSS 
standard in his teens and later contributed to the formation of Reddit, 
the Creative Commons project, and OpenLibrary.org.174 It appears 
largely undisputed that in 2011, Swartz sought to provide the public 
with free access to subscription-only articles in the academic database 
JSTOR.175 He broke into computer networks at M.I.T. by leaving a 
laptop hooked up to the system in a utility closet, signing in under a 
false account and downloading 4.8 million documents that he planned to 
release before law enforcement officials thwarted him.176 Prosecutors 
initially charged him with four, but later with a total of thirteen criminal 
counts,177 and according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Aaron Swartz 
theoretically “face[d] up to 35 years in prison, to be followed by three 
years of supervised release, restitution, forfeiture and a fine of up to $1 
million.”178 According to statements that prosecutors allegedly made to 
his defense attorneys, Swartz’s actual prison sentence was likely to be 
in the ballpark of seven years if a court convicted him.179 The charges 
                                                                                                                     
 173. By way of clarification, this Article’s decision to include a section on Aaron Swartz 
should not be construed as a sudden endorsement of an excessive focus on individual instead of 
statistical victims in the making of public policy. Rather, this Article uses his tale to exemplify 
the power of individual stories as a historical matter and it expresses skepticism as to how 
society ignores the potential plight of lesser-known people in similar prosecutions. See infra 
note 187 and accompanying text. 
 174. Kevin Poulsen, Aaron Swartz, Coder and Activist, Dead at 26, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2013, 
4:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/aaron-swartz. 
 175. Of the 4.8 million documents, 1.7 million normally required payment to be accessed. 
Charles Arthur, Reddit Co-Founder Accused of Stealing 4.8m JSTOR Documents from MIT, 
GUARDIAN (July 19, 2011. 1:56 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/19/reddit-
founder-swartz-jstor-accused. 
 176. John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a 
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-
swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html. 
 177. Tim Cushing, US Government Ups Felony Count in JSTOR/Aaron Swartz Case from 
Four to Thirteen, TECHDIRT (Sept. 18, 2012, 7:24 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/ 
20120917/17393320412/us-government-ups-felony-count-jstoraaron-swartz-case-four-to-thirtee 
n.shtml. 
 178. Alleged Hacker Charged with Stealing over Four Million Documents from MIT 
Network, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 19, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/ 
SwartzAaronPR.html. Some others place that figure as high as fifty or more years in prison and 
$4 million in fines. Cushing, supra note 177. 
 179. Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial 
Discretion), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:34 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, Prosecutorial 
Discretion], http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartz-
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consisted of two counts of Wire Fraud, five counts of Computer Fraud, 
five counts of Unlawfully Obtaining Information from a Protected 
Computer, and one count of Recklessly Damaging a Protected 
Computer.180 On January 11, 2013, Aaron Swartz hanged himself in his 
Brooklyn apartment, and his family and partner believe that the 
prosecution and threat of a long prison term and large fines contributed 
to his decision to end his life; they called his death “the product of a 
criminal justice system rife with intimidation and prosecutorial 
overreach.”181 
Some commentators do not believe that the charges against Aaron 
Swartz stood on firm legal ground,182 but others, including cybercrime 
expert Orin Kerr, disagree.183 Regardless of this disputed issue, 
however, a few points of consensus emerge among a majority of 
commentators. One is that whether a law is just or unjust and imposes 
high or low sanctions, prosecutors possess enormous power when they 
decide not only whether to bring a case in the first place but also how 
hard to push it.184 In the aftermath of Swartz’s death, some 
commentators stated that criminal law has evolved such that many 
                                                                                                                     
part-2-prosecutorial-discretion. It is worth noting that for some types of defendants, “collateral 
effects [of criminal law] are quite steep, attach very early, and are often irrevocable.” Baer, 
supra note 86, at 1312. 
 180. Cushing, supra note 177. 
 181. Family and Partner of Aaron Swartz, Official Statement, SOUP (Jan. 12, 2013), 
http://soupsoup.tumblr.com/post/40373383323/official-statement-from-the-family-and-partner-
of; Aaron Swartz’s Father Says Reddit Co-Founder Was ‘Killed by the Government,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/aaron-
swartz-father-says-killed-by-government_n_2482646.html. The reasons for any suicide are 
certainly complex, and there is no doubt that Swartz had preexisting struggles with depression. 
See Laurie Segall, Activist Aaron Swartz’s Suicide Sparks Talk About Depression, CNNMONEY 
(Jan. 14, 2013, 7:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/14/technology/swartz-suicide-
depression/index.html.  
 182. See Max Kennerly, Examining the Outrageous Aaron Swartz Indictment for Computer 
Fraud, LITIG. & TRIAL BLOG (July 19, 2011), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/ 
07/articles/series/special-comment/aaron-swartz-computer-fraud-indictment (arguing that the 
charges against Aaron Swartz rest on a shaky legal basis); Mike Masnick, The Lack of a Legal 
or Moral Basis for the Aaron Swartz Indictment Is Quite Troubling, TECHDIRT (July 20, 2011, 
12:06 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110720/00581915173/lack-legal-moral-basis-
aaron-swartz-indictment-is-quite-troubling.shtml (responding to Kennerly’s analysis regarding 
the charges against Aaron Swartz). 
 183. Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 1: The Law), VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2013, 2:50 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-
charges. For a partial critique of Professor Kerr’s take, see James Boyle, The Prosecution of 
Aaron Swartz: A Reply to Orin Kerr, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:11 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyle/prosecution-aaron-swartz_b_2508242.html. 
 184. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Did Prosecutors Go Too Far in Swartz’s Case?, NPR (Jan. 
15, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/15/169421636/did-prosecutors-go-too-far-in-
swartz-case. 
39
Manta: The High Cost of Low Sanctions
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
196 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
respectable people today likely violate it.185 Internet scholar James 
Grimmelmann believes that he himself probably violated some of the 
same laws as Swartz in the past when Grimmelmann engaged in a mass 
download of his own old blog posts.186 While Orin Kerr thinks that the 
charges against Swartz conformed to the law, he poignantly writes: 
[T]he broader point is that if we think aggressive 
prosecution tactics such as this are improper, we shouldn’t 
be focused just on the Aaron Swartz case. Rather, we 
should be shining a light on the federal criminal system in 
its entirety. These sorts of tactics have been going on for 
years, without many people paying attention. If we don’t 
want a world in which prosecutors have these powers, we 
shouldn’t just object when the defendant in the crosshairs is 
a genius who went to Stanford, hangs out with Larry 
Lessig, and is represented by the extremely expensive 
lawyers at Keker & Van Nest. We should object just as 
much—or even more—when the defendant is poor, 
unknown, and unconnected to the powerful. To do 
otherwise sends an extremely troubling message to 
prosecutors that they need to be extra sensitive when 
considering charges against defendants with connections. 
We have too much of a two-tiered justice system already, I 
think. So blame the system and aim to reform the system; 
don’t think that this was just two or three prosecutors that 
were doing something unusual. It wasn’t.187 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See, e.g., Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz—and Us, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyone-
interesting-is-a-felon.html. 
 186. James Grimmelmann, My Career as a Bulk Downloader, LABORATORIUM (Jan. 16, 
2013, 12:43 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/01/16/my_career_as_a_bulk_downloader. 
 187.  Kerr, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 179; see also Ian Bassin, In Remembering 
Aaron Swartz, Let’s Not Forget Jamel Dossie, MORUM (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:01 PM), 
http://themorum.blogspot.com/2013/01/in-remembering-aaron-swartz-lets-not.html (“Often it 
takes a rare injustice perpetrated against a privileged young person for our society to recognize 
the common injustices we visit every day upon less-privileged minorities.”); James 
Grimmelmann, Comment to My Career as a Bulk Downloader, LABORATORIUM (Jan. 16, 2013, 
9:48 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/01/16/my_career_as_a_bulk_downloader#comment-
70137 (“The treatment he received—using an insanely disproportionate sentence as a threat to 
pressure him into accepting a sentence that is ‘only’ seriously disproportionate—is a standard 
part of the prosecutorial toolkit.”). For proposals to rein in prosecutorial discretion in the 
aftermath of Aaron Swartz’s and others’ legal cases, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham 
Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime (Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 206, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2 
203713. 
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One of Kerr’s proposals to improve the situation in the area of 
computer-related offenses is to amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (CFAA) to make it more difficult for an instance of suspected 
unauthorized access to trigger felony liability.188 He has proposed 
model language for such a statute,189 and the Electronic Freedom 
Foundation (EFF) and others have suggested possible amendments to 
that language.190 The time may indeed be ripe for a reexamination of the 
CFAA, although some believe that society may experience a 
counterproductive backlash against such efforts after the hacker group 
Anonymous attacked the DOJ’s website and threatened to release 
confidential information about Supreme Court Justices unless Congress 
changes the way it handles sentencing and computer crime.191  
Whether legislative alternatives succeed or not, Swartz’s story and 
its sad ending provide further illustration for this Article’s claim that 
sometimes it takes the threat of high sanctions—in this case in the form 
of potential punishments for accumulated counts against a fairly well-
known individual who killed himself—to get the public’s attention and 
put heft behind calls for legislative change.192 Aaron Swartz’s death 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Kerr, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 179. 
 189. Orin Kerr, Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20, 
2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/20/proposed-amendments-to-18-u-s-c-1030. 
For a critique of the proposal, see Stewart Baker, A Dubious Proposal for Amending the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2013, 7:07 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/28/a-dubious-proposal-for-amending-the-computer-fraud-and-
abuse-act. 
 190. See Orin Kerr, Aaron’s Law, Drafting the Best Limits of the CFAA, and a Reader Poll 
on a Few Examples, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 27, 2013, 11:46 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/27/aarons-law-drafting-the-best-limits-of-the-cfaa-and-a-reader-
poll-on-a-few-examples-part-i (summarizing suggested changes and clarifying the effect of the 
law in practice). 
 191. Stewart Baker, Anonymous Attacks Again, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 26, 2013, 1:39 
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/26/anonymous-attacks-again; see also Jessica Meyers, Online Activists 
Fret over Extremism, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2013, 4:38 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/online-
activists-extremists-hurt-cause-86963.html (“Supporters of online freedoms worry extreme acts may 
thwart the momentum gained last year with the crushing defeat of anti-piracy legislation.”). Another 
incident potentially linked to the revenge campaign of Anonymous on behalf of Swartz is the 
hacking into the Federal Reserve that occurred shortly after his death. Charles Riley, Hackers 
Access Federal Reserve Website, Data, CNNMONEY (Feb. 7, 2013), 
money.cnn.com/2013/02/06/technology/federal-reserve-hack. Professor Eric Posner argues that 
Aaron Swartz’s prosecution will ultimately help to promote open access policies. Eric Posner, 
How Aaron Swartz’s Cause Wins in the End, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/01/aaron_swartz_ 
beat_prosecutors_by_increasing_political_support_for_open_access.html. 
 192. It turns out that a few years ago, the same prosecutor that went after Swartz was 
involved in a prosecution against another lesser-known hacker who also killed himself. See 
Justine Sharrock, Internet Activist’s Prosecutor Linked to Another Hacker’s Death, BUZZFEED 
(Jan. 14, 2013, 8:10 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/justinesharrock/internet-activists-
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drew bipartisan comments from members of Congress as well as led to 
both a decision by House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa 
to investigate the prosecution193 and a public demonstration in New 
York City.194 It also prompted an online petition to remove U.S. District 
Attorney Carmen Ortiz from office for her role in Swartz’s prosecution, 
a petition that quickly crossed the threshold of 25,000 signatures needed 
to produce a response from the White House.195 Most recently, 
Representatives Issa and Elijah Cummings wrote a letter to the Attorney 
General “to request a briefing about the decisions by federal prosecutors 
to bring criminal charges in 2011 and 2012 against Internet activist 
Aaron Swartz.”196 The letter asks incisive questions such as “[w]hat 
factors influenced the decision to prosecute Mr. Swartz for the crimes 
alleged in the indictment, including the decisions regarding what crimes 
to charge and the filing of the superseding indictment”;197 whether 
Swartz’s association with SOPA or any advocacy groups influenced 
these choices; how the prosecution made decisions in regard to plea 
offers and sentencing proposals; and why the prosecution filed a 
superseding indictment.198 When Attorney General Eric Holder faced 
questions as to whether the Swartz case involved prosecutorial 
overreach, he responded in the negative and stated that the relevant 
factor was not “what necessarily was charged as much as what was 
                                                                                                                     
prosecutor-linked-to-another-h. Swartz’s attorney also accused the prosecutor, Stephen 
Heymann, of exploiting cases like Swartz’s for his own publicity. Zach Carter, Aaron Swartz’s 
Lawyer: Prosecutor Stephen Heymann Wanted ‘Juicy’ Case for Publicity, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Jan. 14, 2013, 4:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-stephen-
heymann_n_2473278.html. 
 193. Ryan J. Reilly et al., Darrell Issa Probing Prosecution of Aaron Swartz, Internet 
Pioneer Who Killed Himself, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/darrell-issa-aaron-swartz-_n_2481450.html. 
 194. Clare Trapasso & Daniel Beekman, Crowd Mourns Reddit Founder Aaron Swartz, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2013, 1:01 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/friends-
family-mourn-reddit-founder-article-1.1243444. 
 195. Betsy Isaacson, Petition to Remove Carmen Ortiz, Aaron Swartz Prosecutor, Reaches 
Threshold for White House Response, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 1:44 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/petition-to-remove-carmen-ortiz_n_2479458.html; 
see also Petition to Remove Prosecutor in Aaron Swartz Case up for White House Response, RT 
(Feb. 13, 2013, 8:48 PM), http://rt.com/usa/news/swartz-prosecutor-petition-response-163 
(discussing the petition and explaining that the petition threshold changed from 25,000 to 
100,000 signatures shortly after Aaron Swartz’s death). 
 196. Letter from Darrell E. Issa & Elijah E. Cummings, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, to Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2013), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2013-01-28-DEI-EEC-to-Holder-re-Aar  
on-Schwartz-prosecution.pdf.  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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offered, in terms of how the case might have been resolved.”199 
Suspicions run deep in many quarters that the DOJ sought to make an 
example out of Swartz because he was a prominent figure who had 
already angered the government by opposing SOPA and attempting to 
provide free access to public court documents that normally involve 
individual payments through the PACER system.200 
Some, including Carmen Ortiz’s husband Tom Dolan, defended the 
prosecutors’ actions and argued that the prosecution offered Swartz a 
plea deal that involved only about six months in prison.201 One 
commentator argues that prosecutors “go after defendants tooth and 
nail, overcharging them from the abundance of criminal laws with 
sentences so severe and out of proportion to the crime that, as now 
happens in 95 percent of criminal cases, the prudent choice is to cop a 
plea.”202 Most of those deals—and hence the stories of people who go to 
jail or prison for six months here or six months there, which symbolizes 
relatively low sanctions in the grand scheme of terms of imprisonment 
despite the possible unfairness of some of those terms—never make it 
into the news. Swartz is one of the few who refused to take that option. 
While he worried about the prospect of prison, his greatest fear was to 
be labeled a felon.203 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Justin Peters, Eric Holder to Senate Judiciary Committee: Aaron Swartz Case Was “A 
Good Use of Prosecutorial Discretion,” SLATE (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/03/06/aaron_swartz_eric_holder_calls_aaron_swartz_ca
se_a_good_use_of_prosecutorial.html (criticizing Holder’s attempt to decouple the charges 
from the possible outcome). 
 200. See, e.g., Tim Carmody, Memory to Myth: Tracing Aaron Swartz Through the 21st 
Century, VERGE (Jan. 22, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/22/3898584/
aaron-swartz-profile-memory-to-myth (describing Aaron Swartz’s life, accomplishments, and 
the motivations behind his actions). 
 201. Prosecutor’s Husband Defends Push to Jail Internet Activist, BUZZFEED (Jan. 15, 
2013, 7:20 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/buzzfeednews/prosecutors-husband-defends-push-
to-jail-internet. 
 202. Lincoln Caplan, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2013, 10:06 AM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/aaron-swartz-and-
prosecutorial-discretion; see also Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Draw Fire for Sentences Called 
Harsh, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/us/federal-prosecutors-
assailed-in-outcry-over-sentencing.html (discussing the criticism that “federal prosecutors are 
strong-arming defendants into pleading guilty and overpunishing those who do not—
undermining the fairness and credibility of the justice system”). Given the power of prosecutors, 
a further concern is the possibility that much prosecutorial misconduct and failure to turn over to 
the defense exculpating evidence goes undetected. See Editorial, Rampant Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/ra 
mpant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html. 
 203. David Amsden, The Brilliant Life and Tragic Death of Aaron Swartz, ROLLING STONE 
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-brilliant-life-and-tragic-death-of-
aaron-swartz-20130215; see also Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, HUFFINGTON POST 
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Did the drafters of the laws that Swartz allegedly broke envision 
defendants like him? If so, were the laws’ sanctions calibrated properly 
and did the laws account for the possibility of overzealous prosecutors? 
Professor Lawrence Lessig and others have argued that thirty-five years 
in prison would have been a very disproportionate punishment.204 If that 
is the case, the DOJ’s press release touting this figure appears morally 
dubious even if it was unlikely that a judge would have actually 
sentenced Swartz to anything near that length of time.205 If the laws did 
not envision defendants like Swartz, were the gains from those laws 
sufficient to warrant the potential level of excess seen in some 
individual cases like his? And, as a related matter, would Congress have 
passed those laws had it realized that this is how they would be used? 
Some of these questions are difficult to answer, whether in the abstract 
or in particular cases, because Congress often does not explain its 
actions, or different congressional actors may have digressing views and 
motives. Further, some of the answers depend on the specific time 
frame that one is examining. What is known is that the CFAA, which 
prosecutors used in Swartz’s case, started off in 1986 as a criminal 
statute meant to protect national security interests but was amended four 
times since (including through the Patriot Act, which this Article 
discusses above)206 to significantly expand its scope.207 Given the often 
unavoidable expansion of scope of liability and the rise in sanctions for 
offenses—driven by either later legislative increases of the sanction 
levels or ambitious prosecutorial accumulation of criminal counts in 
indictments—the Aaron Swartz story shows that bills about offenses in 
the rapidly changing technological world of information appropriation 
and dissemination may deserve particular scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                     
(Jan. 13, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/aaron-swartz-
suicide_b_2467079.html (questioning the government’s need to press for felony charges against 
Swartz). Swartz also likened his experience with the prosecution to the experience that Franz 
Kafka describes in the novel “The Trial.” Amsden, supra.  
 204. See Lessig, supra note 203 (opining that the government overcharged Swartz for his 
crime); Alex Stamos, The Truth About Aaron Swartz’s “Crime,” UNHANDLED EXCEPTION (Jan. 
12, 2013), http://unhandled.com/2013/01/12/the-truth-about-aaron-swartzs-crime (stating that 
Swartz’s illegal downloading did not merit thirty-five years in jail). 
 205. See Kerr, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 179 (discussing government press 
releases’ tendencies to publicize maximum sentences, as opposed to the more realistic lower 
sentence possibilities). 
 206. See supra Section I.A. 
 207. For a discussion of the evolution of the CFAA, see Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes & 
Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
909, 912–17 (2003). 
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D.  Lessons 
As shown in this Article, the phenomena that affect low sanctions 
are not necessarily limited to information-related offenses. The 
seemingly unique nature of copyright in the level of large-scale illegal 
behavior that it currently entails is partially due to the historical 
development of technology, but future development in addition to other 
events could lead to a different set of targeted areas. The lessons from 
the copyright context should make society reconsider its approach to 
lawmaking if that occurs. Before legislators resort to criminalization, 
caution is advised. Roberta Romano has proposed limitations to the 
potential damage from ill-advised crisis-based financial regulation 
through sunset requirements, among other measures.208 Perhaps we 
need this or another novel approach to any expansions in criminal laws 
(or civil laws likely to lead to criminal ones), at least at the federal level. 
At a minimum, a legislator who faces the question of whether to support 
a new law that carries low sanctions (law A) and is concerned that it 
could lead to a less acceptable law with high sanctions (law B) for the 
same offense  
should consider all the mechanisms through which A might 
lead to B, whether they are logical or psychological, 
judicial or legislative, gradual or sudden. [She] should 
consider these mechanisms whether or not [she] think[s] 
that A and B are on a continuum where B is in some sense 
more of A, a condition that would in any event be hard to 
define precisely. [She] should think about the entire range 
of possible ways that A can change the conditions—
whether those conditions are public attitudes, political 
alignments, costs and benefits, or what have you—under 
which others will consider B.209 
This determination is complex and fraught with uncertainty, but it is 
better to attempt it than to forsake it altogether.210 Along those lines, 
                                                                                                                     
 208. See Romano, supra note 9, at 14. 
 209. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 
1031 (2003) (footnote omitted). Volokh makes this point in the context of legal slippery slopes 
generally, and he provides guidance throughout his article on how a proper analysis should 
proceed. See id. Legislators must consider the cost of refusing to pass law A as well, including in 
the context of the “broken windows” theory. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE 
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 59–89 (2001) (describing the theory while 
rejecting its validity). 
 210. On a related note, David Schraub describes how at least some of the time, a 
phenomenon termed “sticky slopes” occurs, which can have the opposite effect of slippery 
slopes and lead a small legal reform to become an obstacle to a larger one. See David H. 
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lawmakers should be wary of low-sanction laws that sponsors propose 
as compromises between the people who do not wish to see any 
sanctions and those who advocate for harsh ones, as “relatively 
inconsequential measures might soften public resistance to much more 
restrictive forms of regulation. Indeed, the sponsors of such laws, who 
promote them . . . vehemently . . . , are no doubt banking on just this 
effect.”211 
Public reactions to future legislative proposals in copyright and other 
areas that exhibit similar features will depend on many factors, but one 
of them is likely to be the height of sanctions. This is true both because 
stories of high sanctions will naturally raise more opposition in a public 
whose views on copyright are acutely tuned to the level of sanctions and 
because the high-sanction stories will more easily make their way into 
the media in the first place. For legal scholars, this phenomenon raises 
the importance of paying attention to the level of sanctions in bills and 
discussing important laws accompanied by low sanctions that the media 
may neglect. For the more interested members of the public (and this is 
certainly true for other reasons as well), it increases the necessity of 
seeking out information on policy topics outside of the mainstream 
media. For journalists, the lesson may be that to the extent they 
recognize the importance of particular pieces of legislation—be that 
recognition for their immediate wide-spread effect albeit in the form of 
low sanctions, or the likelihood that said sanctions will not stay low for 
long—they should consider incorporating elements into their writing 
that will attract a large readership despite the lack of an identifiable 
victim who suffered a shockingly high sanction. This may involve 
having journalists and other writers work on better ways to teach 
readers about statistical information.212 Very popular books such as 
Freakonomics213 have shown that, while challenging, the task is not 
                                                                                                                     
Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1249, 1252 (2013). Two situations in which this 
could take place are if “prior victories exhaust the political will of representatives and their 
constituents to support further efforts” or if “a particular high profile victory mobilizes 
opponents, creating an effective cadre of political activists where none had previously existed.” 
See id. at 1291, 1264. As to the latter point, like this Article discusses, few laws with low 
sanctions will have that effect. As to the former issue, laws with low sanctions will generally be 
insufficient to satisfy a group that has a high enough stake in the first place to engage in 
activism over a particular political question. Schraub describes a number of settings in which his 
thesis may hold, but these do not tend to be instances that involve sanctions, but rather ones 
related to civil liberties. See id. 
 211. Kahan, supra note 7, at 643. 
 212. For an account of the importance of numeracy in the legal context, see generally 
Arden Rowell & Jessica L. Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decisionmaking, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2163645. 
 213. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2005). 
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impossible. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article provides some evidence that the law generally and 
copyright law specifically contain risks tied to low sanctions. For the 
reasons explained previously, hard empirical evidence is difficult to 
gather, but the conclusions of this Article’s argument are unlikely to be 
problematic even if the effect is smaller than anticipated. Anyone with 
an interest in policy making should pay attention if legislators propose 
new legislation that has low sanctions. Sanctions could rise over time, 
or they could be widespread enough to cause significant damage. The 
media and others are generally unlikely to intensely scrutinize 
legislation accompanied by low-level sanctions. In copyright, the results 
are evident from sanctions that have crept up and veered from merely 
civil penalties to criminal ones. It took a combination of (1) high 
sanctions, (2) the sudden realization that high sanctions could directly or 
indirectly affect large portions of the population, and (3) efforts by 
corporate entities, grassroots organizations, and individuals who used 
the tools of social networking to stop the tide for the first time. This is 
not the last occasion for expansion of substantive copyright law or of its 
enforcement. To the extent that the public perceives any of these 
expansions as inefficient or counterproductive, it must pay closer 
attention in coming years, and advocates will have to find ways to 
overcome the bias against the expenditure of energy when legislation 
involves low sanctions. At times, policy makers will have to make 
difficult decisions if a law may be just when it involves low sanctions 
but become unjust as the sanctions rise; indeed, they may need to 
predict how likely it is that sanctions will increase and whether the 
perceived benefits of the initial legislation are larger than the possible 
disadvantages down the road. 
Future research on the psychological and practical effects of low 
sanctions will likely yield important information not only to avoid 
passing suboptimal laws but also to promote otherwise beneficial ones. 
Different levels of sanctions will always attach a variety of social 
meanings to the punished actions.214 At times, it is traditionally 
understood, sanctions will signal that a behavior is unacceptable and 
will deter its occurrence. At other times, however, the message will be 
interpreted in a diametrically opposed way, such as was the case in a 
day-care study where fines for parents late to pick up their children 
                                                                                                                     
 214. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 
(1995) (defining social meanings as “the semiotic content attached to various actions, or 
inactions, or statuses, within a particular context”). 
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actually increased the occurrence of the behavior, perhaps because the 
fines made such events seem more socially acceptable.215 The story of 
the role of sanctions in shaping human behavior, including people’s 
decisions to follow proper laws or oppose undesirable ones, remains 
incompletely told for now. This Article provides just one step in 
highlighting some of the remaining puzzles and showing that when it 
comes to sanctions, everything may not be quite as it seems at first 
glance.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 215. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–15 (2000). 
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